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MYRL L. DUNCAN*
Toward a Theory of Broad-based
Planning for the Preservation of
Agricultural Land-
People must fully understand the irreplaceable value of prime farm-
lands, and the ominous meaning of the war between the bulldozer
and the plow. When farmland goes, food goes. Asphalt is the land's
last crop.
M. Rupert Cutler, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture
for Natural Resources and Environment'
INTRODUCTION
Thomas Jefferson believed the independent farmer and his way of life
to be such fundamental elements of democracy2 that he advocated the
allocation of small tracts of Virginia's seemingly limitless western lands
to every adult male.3 Two hundred years later, Jefferson would no doubt
be astounded to learn that the adequacy of that vast agricultural land base
is threatened by every encroaching development. The recent report by
the National Agricultural Lands Study (NALS) reveals that between 1967
and 1975 some 23.2 million acres of agricultural land,4 an area equal to
slightly less than the combined land areas of Vermont, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Delaware,5 were converted
to nonagricultural use. 6 Approximately one-third of the nearly three mil-
lion acres developed each year7 comes from prime farmland, lands pos-
*Associate Professor of Law, Washburn University School of Law, LL.M. Columbia,1981; J.D.
Georgetown, 1975; B.A. University of Kansas, 1970.
tThis article is the first in a series on agricultural land preservation being submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law in the Faculty of
Law, Columbia University. The author wishes to thank Curtis Berger, Frank Grad and James Wadley
for their contributions to the improvement of the article.
1. Cutler, The Peril of Vanishing Farmlands, New York Times, July 1, 1980, Al9, col. 5.
2. "[G]enerally speaking, the proportion which the aggregate of the other classes of citizens bears
in any State to that of its husbandmen, is the proportion of its unsound to its healthy parts, and is
a good enough barometer whereby to measure its degree of corruption." Jefferson, Notes on the
State of Virginia, query XIX (1787).
3. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J. LAW &
ECON. 467, 470 (1976).
4. National Agricultural Lands Study (NALS), Final Report (1981) (hereinafter Final Report).
For discussion of the creation of NALS, see infra, notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
5. The total land area of these states is 23,470,272 acres. U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census, 1974 Census ofAgriculture.
6. Final Report, supra note 4, at 36.
7. The figure included 675 thousand acres of cropland, 537 thousand of range and pastureland,
825 thousand from forestland, and 875 thousand from "other" land uses. Id. at 35.
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sessing the best combination of physical and chemical characteristics
needed to preserve sustained high yields." While the nation is in no danger
of completely destroying its 1.36 billion acre privately owned agricultural
land base,9 the large scale conversion of farmland must be evaluated in
the context of projections indicating that substantial additional farmland
will be required to meet increasing demand for agricultural products.' 0
When the future is viewed from that perspective, NALS believes that
"the conversion . . . is a cause for serious concern.""1
After examining the nature and causes of the problem, this article will
review a number of programs which are attempting to stem the tide of
conversion. The analysis will reveal that programs which incorporate
elements of land use planning and control have been, or have the potential
to be, more successful than strictly voluntary programs. Thus, while this
article will not attempt to propose specific programs, it seems clear that
the protection of agricultural land will be most effectively achieved through
a system of broad-based land use planning and control.' 2
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Federal Recognition of the Problem
While the full magnitude of the problem became apparent only with
the release of the recent NALS report, that study was itself the product
of concern that grew throughout the 1970s. That concern manifested itself
in several national land use policy and planning assistance bills which
8. Keene, Agricultural Land Preservation: Legal and Constitutional Issues, 15 GONZ. L. REV.
621 (1980). Prime farmland "has the best combination of physical and chemical characteristics for
producing food, feed, forage, fiber, and oilseed crops, and is also available for these uses (the land
could be cropland, pastureland, rangeland, forest land or other land, but not urban built-up land or
water). It has the soil quality, growing season, and moisture supply needed to economically produce
sustained high yields of crops when treated and managed, including water management, according
to acceptable fanning methods." 7 C.F.R. § 657.5(a) (1980). Like the NALS study, this article will
focus not only on prime farmland but on the broader land base.
9. Final Report, supra note 4, at 29. The figure includes 413 million acres of cropland, 414
million of rangeland, 133 million of pastureland, 376 million of forestland, 11 million of farmsteads,
and 12 million of "other lands in farms." Also included are 127 million acres of high and medium
potential cropland. Id. Not included are approximately 500 million acres of federally owned agri-
cultural land, virtually all of which is grazing or forestland. Id. at 28-29.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 46-53.
11. Final Report, supra note 4, at 85. While perhaps the most comprehensive, the NALS Final
Report is only one of a number of studies reaching essentially the same conclusion. Fletcher and
Little, The American Cropland Crisis (1982); Agricultural Land Availability: Papers on the Supply
and Demand forAgricultural Lands in the United States, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition
and Forestry, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1981); Preserving America's Farmland-A Goal
The Federal Government Should Support (Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General) (1979);
Didericksen, Potential Cropland Study, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Soil Conservation Service, Sta-
tistical Bull No. 578 (1977) (cited in Fletcher and Little, supra note 11, at 5).
12. Although land use planning is often thought of as distinct from land use control, I mean to
encompass both with the term "planning" in the title. See infra text accompanying note 75.
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were introduced in Congress, but never enacted. 3 While leaving primary
land use policy with the states, those acts nonetheless recognized the
need to establish a national policy that "land use planning, management
and development [should be] in accord with sound environmental, eco-
nomic and social values which encourage the wise and balanced use of
the Nation's land resources." 14 Federal funds would have been made
available to state governments 5 for the development of a variety of land
use schemes, including programs to evaluate and plan for agricultural
needs. 16
Agricultural land planning per se was first addressed by the 95th Con-
gress which considered a proposed National Agricultural Land Policy
Act." The act would have provided federal funds to state programs for
the demonstration or testing of preservation methods.' 8 Similar but stronger
legislation was defeated by the 96th Congress. 9 That legislation would
have required that impact upon agricultural land be taken into account in
federal agency decision-making, and that federal agency programs and
actions be administered in a manner consistent with state or local land
retention programs.2
The executive branch of the federal government began to act on the
problem at about the same time as Congress. Despite the fact that as late
as 1974 the United States Department of Agriculture sought to minimize
the dangers of farmland conversion,2' other agencies began to make policy
changes. In 197622 and 19803 memoranda to agency heads, the Presi-
dent's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) urged that, in preparation
13. E.g., S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 632, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (passed by
the Senate, 118 Cong. Rec. 31217 (1972)); S. 3354, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 16028, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); H.R. 10294, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1974); H.R. 4862, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973).
14. Id. S. 268 § 102(b)(1) (1973).
15. Id. Title III.
16. Id. §302(a).
17. Dunford, The Evolution of Federal Farmland Protection Policy, 37 J. SOIL & WATER
CONSERVATION 133, 134-35 (May-June 1982).
18. H.R. 5882, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See Hearings on H.R. 5882 Before the Subcomm.
on Family Farms, Rural Development and Special Studies of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
19. Dunford, supra note 17, at 135.
20. H.R. 2551, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See Hearing on H.R. 2551 Before the Subcomm.
on Family Farms, Rural Development and Special Studies of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S. 795, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). See Hearing on S. 795 Before the
Subcomm. on Environment, Soil Conservation, and Forestry of the Senate Comm. on Agriculture,
Nutrition and Forestry, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
21. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Misc. Pub. No. 1290 (1974)
(quoted in Juergensmeyer, Farmland Preservation: A Vital Agricultural Law Issue for the 1980's,
21 WASHBURN L. J. 443, 448 (1982)).
22. Council on Environmental Quality, 1976 Memorandum for Heads of Agencies (August 30,
1976) (noted in Dunford, supra note 17, at 134.
23. 45 Fed. Reg. 59189 (1980).
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of environmental impact statements required by the National Environ-
mental Policy Act (NEPA),24 agencies analyze the effect their actions
would have on farmland.' However, only two agencies, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA)26 and the Department of Agriculture
(USDA),27 which changed its position,28 developed explicit policies to
ensure such considerations. 29
Most significantly, in June, 1979, USDA and CEQ agreed to oversee
an eighteen month interagency study of all aspects of the problem. 30 The
resulting National Agricultural Lands Study (NALS) Final Report,"' is-
sued in January, 1981, documents the problem's complex and critical
nature.
The NALS Report
In order to put its statistics on farmland conversion into a meaningful
context, the study projects three major agricultural demands to the year
2000. First, it is estimated that domestic demand for food and fiber will
24. 42 U.S.C. §4321 etseq. (1976).
25. The National Agricultural Land Policy Act of 1977 § 101(b)(4) sought to require such an
analysis. H.R. 5882, supra note 18.
26. 40 C.F.R. § 6.302(c) (1981). EPA's policy statement also provided that new sewage facilities
within its control were not to be located on agricultural land except in limited circumstances. All
levels of government were encouraged to cooperate to preserve farmland. Dunford, supra note 17,
at 134.
27. In 1976, Secretary of Agriculture Butz issued a policy statement providing that "USDA will
urge all agencies to adopt the policy that federal activities that take prime agricultural land should
be initiated only when there are no suitable alternative sites and when the action is in response to
an overriding public need." U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Secretary's Memorandum No. 1827, Supp.
I (June 21, 1976) (quoted in Dunford, supra note 17, at 134).
In 1978, Secretary of Agriculture Bergland issued a revised policy statement establishing USDA
as an advocate of farmland preservation: "whenever proposed conversions are: (1) caused or en-
couraged by actions or programs of a federal agency; (2) licensed by or require approval by a federal
agency; or (3) inconsistent with local or state government plans." In addition, agencies within USDA
were asked to review regulations that encouraged farmland conversion and to promulgate new policies
consistent with state and local preservation programs. Finally, the statement mandated USDA's
participation in decision-making by other federal agencies whenever farmland might be affected.
U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Secretary's Memorandum No. 1827 (revised Oct. 30, 1978) (quoted in
Dunford, supra note 17 at 134).
28. Not long after the 1974 report, USDA's Soil Conservation Service (SCS) completed a survey
which revealed that only about one-half of the 266 million acres assumed to be reserve or potential
cropland could in fact be realistically counted as such. Dideriksen, supra note 11. See also Fletcher
and Little, supra note 11, at 5-6.
29. The Farmland Protection Policy Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 4201-09 (1981), discussed in text accom-
panying infra notes 62-71, provides that USDA shall "develop criteria for identifying the effects
of Federal programs on the conversion of farmland to nonagricultural uses." Federal agencies are
instructed to use those criteria "to identify and take into account the adverse effects of Federal
programs on the preservation of farmland" and to consider less destructive alternatives. 7 U.S.C.
§ 4202.
30. Final Report, supra note 4.
31. NALS was charged with looking at the nature, rate, extent, and causes of conversion; eval-
uating the economic, environmental, and social consequences of that conversion and methods used
to restrict it; and recommending governmental actions to restrict potential future losses. Id. at 4.
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increase by volume approximately one percent per year in the 1980s and
decrease only marginally to 0.9 percent during the 1990s.32 Only about
one-third of the increase will be attributable to rising income and higher
per capita consumption, with the other two-thirds attributable to popu-
lation growth.33 Similarly, domestic demand for forest products is ex-
pected to increase 60 percent by the year 2030.14
Second, although acknowledging that it is an "unconventional" de-
mand,35 NALS estimates the acreage that will be required to support
gasohol production. The report concludes that in order to meet USDA
production capacity projections of 4.2 billion gallons by 1990 and 5.7
billion by 2000, a net of seven to eleven million acres of new row crops
will be needed.36
Finally, the report analyzes export demand. Agricultural commodities
account for nearly 20 percent of all U.S. exports, or $40.5 billion in
1979." 7 Currently the United States exports the production from approx-
imatley one out of three acres. 3 American exports account for 72 percent
of the world-wide feedgrain trade, up from 42 percent a decade ago.39
The U.S. share of the wheat trade alone rose from 36 to 45 percent in
the period from 1970 to 1980 and is projected to climb to 57 percent by
2000.' Total export demand is expected to triple in the next 20 years. 4'
Moreover, it is the export demand which best illustrates the complexity
of the situation. Assuming that American agriculture can adequately pro-
vide for domestic consumption,42 the United States cannot simply cut its
volume of exports as a solution to the land conversion problem. Leaving
aside the moral question involved in choosing not to supply less developed
countries with food,4 3 such a move would have serious economic reper-
32. Id. at 53. The estimate assumes a constant real price.
33. Id. NALS estimates that by the year 2000, U.S. population will have reached 253,000,000.
Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 54. See also Fletcher & Little, supra note 11, at 123-36.
37. Final Report, supra note 4, at 55.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 55. Constant real prices are again assumed.
42. See Final Report, supra note 4, at 61.
43. "You can probably convince yourself that losing a million acres of cropland out of a 540
million-acre base is indeed a very small percentage in any given year, perhaps hard to get excited
about. But over four years, if you lose 4 million acres, if it happens to be land of moderate productivity,
that land would produce about the same amount of grain that is committed each year to foreign-
assistance programs by all donor nations in the world. From the viewpoint of the world's needy
people, setting aside 4 million acres in Iowa for use later in the century would indeed be viewed as
significant." The National Agricultutl Lands Study: An Interview with Robert J. Gray, 36 J. SOIL
& WATER CONSERVATION, 62, 63 (March-April 1981) (hereinafter Interview).
Another commentary declares that "[t]o view the matter in narrowly economic terms ... is to
risk missing the point: for economics can neither define, measure or assign responsibility in a matter
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cussions. Doubtlessly domestic prices would be affected and, perhaps
more importantly, such a policy would adversely affect U.S. balance of
payments. Simply put, receipts from the foreign sale of U.S. agricultural
commodities are critical in offsetting expenditures for the purchase of
foreign oil; for economic reasons alone agricultural production must be
protected.44
Taking all factors into account, NALS estimates that over the next
twenty years the demand for U.S. agricultural products will increase 60
to 85 percent above the 1980 level. 45 The crucial question then is whether
American agriculture will be able to meet that total demand.
An answer to the question depends in part on an understanding of the
interrelationship between increases in acreage and advances in farming
technology. During the 1960s, the annual 1.4 percent increase in overall
agricultural output came solely from increased yields, as opposed to
increases in planted acreage, which declined slightly.46 During the 1970s,
however, approximately three-fourths of the annual 3.1 percent increase
in production came about because of expanded cultivation.47 Looking to
the future, some scientists believe that technological advances will permit
still further production increases; 41 others believe yield increase to be
tapering off. 4 9 But accepting even the most optimistic scenario, other
factors such as the cost of energy to irrigate land, declining water sup-
plies,5" and air pollution5 will adversely affect production. Taking all
that is ultimately a questions of ethics. Inevitably, a country that has a land base capable of supplying
10 or 15 percent of the world's food supply must come to grips with the issue of whether it also
has an obligation to protect and maintain that resource as best it can." Fletcher & Little, supra note
11, at 91.
44. Raup, Urban Threats to Rural Lands: Background and Beginnings, 41 J. AM INST. PLAN-
NERS 371, 376 (1975).
45. Final Report, supra note 4, at 55. Since the high and low figures reflect more extreme
conditions, the midrange 72.7% figure is considered "most probable." Id.
46. Id. at 56.
47. Id.
48. Heady, Technical Change and the Demand for Land, paper prepared for a Resources for the
Future Conference on the Adequacy of Agricultural Land, (February 13, 1980) (noted id. at 58, n.
24). See also, Preserving America's Farmland, supra note 11, at 14.
49. Jensen, Limits to Growth in World Food Production, 201 SCIENCE (July 28, 1978); Evans,
The Natural History of Crop Yields, 68 AM SCIENTIST (July-Aug 1980) (both noted in Final
Report, supra note 4 at 58, n. 25).
50. Anthan, Land, People Trends Hint At Food 'Disaster', Des Moines Register, July 9, 1977.
The article is one of a series of seven collectively entitled "Vanishing Acres."
51. Id. The author notes that researchers in Southern California have discovered that under polluted
conditions alfalfa production declined 38%, peas 32%, lettuce 42%, and sweet corn 72% from clean-
air yields.
Those findings are reinforced by a recent analysis by the Congressional Office of Technology
Assessment which concluded that ozohe pollution alone is causing losses of $2 billion to $4.5 billion
per year in corn, wheat, soybeans and peanuts. The loss represents as much- as five percent of the
nation's annual farm production. Kansas City Times, Feb. 18, 1982, at At. Thus, "even as the
country destroys more and more prime and unique land, it is increasing its need for that land by
damaging the food production potential of its remaining cropland through air pollution." Anthan,
supra note 50.
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factors into account, NALS concludes that "[u]nlike the decades of the
1960s and 1970s which are often associated with the emergence of sci-
entific agriculture, it appears that the future may be much more dependent
on full and efficient utilization of the agricultural land resources base." 52
Accordingly, the study estimates that between 77 and 113 million addi-
tional acres will need to be planted in principal crops to meet the projected
demand.53
The increased acreage could come from two sources: lands now used
for pasture and hay production,54 and "potential croplands."" Unfortu-
nately, either option, or more probably a combination of the two, would
involve significant costs. For example, withdrawing land from pasture
and hay production would mean greater reliance on feed grain for meat
production,56 thereby further increasing the strain on cropland. The costs
associated with a large scale shift to "potential cropland" would be even
more significant. Only slightly over ten percent57 of potential cropland is
high quality, i.e., possessing favorable physical characteristics and re-
quiring minimal land preparation to support high yield production." Con-
sequently,
[O]nce the supply of land most easily shifted is brought into crop
use, further expansion in planted acreage will entail relatively steep
conversion and management costs. Higher real costs of production
are probable since cropland now coming into cultivation is more
costly to till, is subject to more crop failures and yield variability,
and produces poorer crops on average than land already in cultiva-
tion. 9
In short, shifts from one agricultural use to another cannot be expected
to compensate for the loss of a million acres of prime farmland per year.'
52. Final Report, supra note 4, at 60. See generally, Fletcher & Little, supra note 11, at 92-
122.
53. Id. at 59. The mid-range figure is 95 million. The high and low estimates assume, respectively,
0.75% and 1.5% annual gains in crop yield while the mid-range estimate assumes a 1.25% gain.
Again constant real prices are assumed.
54. NALS indicates that 60 million acres were so used in 1977. Id.
55. The 1.36 billion acre agricultural land base (see supra text accompanying note 8) contains
36 million acres of high potential cropland, 91 million acres medium potential, and 270 million low
potential cropland. Id. at 30.
56. Id. at 60-61. Cf. Interview, supra note 43.
57. Supra note 55.
58. High potential cropland has favorable physical characteristics, requiring minimal land prep-
aration to support high yield production. Id. at 30, 59. Medium potential cropland also possesses
favorable characteristics, but in general, conversion costs and erosion potential are higher than for
high potential lands. Final Report, supra note 4 at 30.
By contrast, low potential croplands are unlikely to be shifted to crop production because of
"serious obstacles" both in the initial conversion and in post-conversion crop management. Id. Such
lands may, however, be made more productive for range and forestry purposes. Id. at 31.
59. Id. at 61.
60. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
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To the contrary, projected farmland requirements can be met only if the
rate of conversion to nonagricultural uses diminishes. Growth need not
stop, but it must be "channel[ed] .. .onto less productive agricultural
land. "61
The Farmland Protection Policy Act
Largely in response to then Secretary of Agriculture Bergland's en-
dorsement of the NALS findings, farmland protection legislation was
once again introduced in the 97th Congress.62 The resulting Farmland
Protection Policy Act of 198163 was enacted as part of the Agriculture
and Food Act of 1981.' The act contains three major elements similar
to those contained in earlier proposed legislation.65 First, the act declares
as one of its purposes that
the Department of Agriculture and other Federal agencies should take
steps to assure that the actions of the Federal Government do not
cause United States farmland to be irreversibly converted to nonagri-
cultural uses in cases in which other national interests do not override
the importance of the protection of farmland nor otherwise outweigh
the benefits of maintaining farmland resources.'
Accordingly, the act provides that
The Department of Agriculture, in cooperation with other depart-
ments, agencies, independent commissions, and other units of the
Federal Government, shall develop criteria for identifying the effects
of Federal programs on the conversion of farmland to nonagricultural
uses.
Departments, agencies, independent commissions, and other units
of the Federal Government shall use the criteria established under
... this section, to identify and take into account the adverse effects
of Federal programs on the preservation of farmland; consider al-
ternative actions, as appropriate, that could lessen such adverse ef-
fects; ...67
Each department, agency, independent commission, or other unit
of the Federal Government, with the assistance of the Department
of Agriculture, shall review current provisions of the law, adminis-
trative rules and regulations, and policies and procedures applicable
to it to determine whether any provision thereof will prevent such
unit of the Federal Government from taking appropriate action to
comply fully with the provisions of this subtitle.
61. Final Report, supra note 4, at 18.
62. Dunford, supra note 17, at 135.
63. 7 U.S.C. §4201 etseq.
64. Pub. L. No. 97-98, 95 Stat. 1343 (1981).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 13-20.
66. 7 U.S.C. §4201(a)(7).
67. Id., § 4202.
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Each department, agency, independent commission, or other unit
of the Federal Government, with the assistance of the Department
of Agriculture, shall, as appropriate, develop proposals for action to
bring its programs, authorities, and administrative activities into con-
formity with the purpose and policy of this subtitle.'
The act also establishes USDA as an information center, using it 1) to
design and implement educational programs aimed at emphasizing the
importance of productive farmland, 2) to designate "farmland information
centers" to serve as central depositories for data on farmland issues, and
3) to make farmland preservation information available to state and local
governments.69
Finally, although the act sets an explicit federal policy against unnec-
essary farmland conversion,7" it is clear that state and local governments
are primarily responsible for establishing preservation programs.
The purpose of this subtitle is to minimize the extent to which Federal
programs contribute to the unnecessary and irreversible conversion
of farmland to nonagricultural uses, and to assure that Federal pro-
grams are administered in a manner that, to the extent practicable,
will be compatible with State, unit of local government, and private
programs and policies to protect farmland. 7'
Thus, even though USDA is encouraged to provide technical assistance
to state and local governmental units or private groups72 wishing to es-
tablish preservation programs,73 the act "does not authorize the Federal
Government in any way to regulate the use of private or non-Federal
land, or in any way affect the property rights of owners of such land."74
State and local governments are thus faced with the task of responding
to a pressing and complex problem.
68. Id., § 4203. In § 160(a)(4) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-35, 95 Stat. 377, Congress enacted a requirement that state or local projects which receive
Farmers' Home Administration (FmHA) loans are to be located, whenever practicable, on non-prime
farmland. The same section provides that private parties who utilize FmHA loans for projects
involving prime farmland will be assessed a two percent annual interest penalty.
69. Id., § 4202(c), § 4205.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
71. 7 U.S.C. §4201(b).
72. This article will not consider the growing number of private farmland trusts. See generally,
Fenner, Land Trusts: An Alternative Method for Preserving Open Space, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1039
(1980); Juergensmeyer, supra note 21, at 463-64; Roe, Innovative Techniques to Preserve Rural
Land Resources, 5 ENVTL. AFF. 419, 433 (1976).
73. 7 U.S.C. § 4204. Earlier proposals which would have provided federal grants for the estab-
lishment of such programs (see supra text accompanying note 18), were omitted from the Farmland
Protection Policy Act. However, other provisions of the omnibus act authorize grants in aid, for
noncapital expenditures, to state and local governments with farmland preservation programs. 16
U.S.C. §3431-36.
74. 7 U.S.C. §4208.
January 1984]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
It is apparent that just as land use planning and control techniques have
been necessary to manage growth while maintaining the integrity of our
urban environments, the conservation of productive agricultural land like-
wise demands innovative land use policies. Moreover, at the urban fringe,
the two sets of problems, and hence their solution, converge. Because
unplanned development is often scattered, it unnecessarily converts farm-
land; it is also costly to local governments which must supply necessary
services. Thus, while it is self-evident that rural communities must con-
sider the effect of growth on their land bases, it is also true that urban
planners have an economic interest in directing growth into patterns which
will coincidentally protect farmland.
While a considerable number of preservation programs have been de-
veloped, they have not always been effective, largely because of a lack
of broad-based planning. Adopting Professor Norman Williams' definition
of planning as "the process of consciously exercising rational control
over the development of the physical environment, and of certain aspects
of social environment, in the light of a common scheme of values, goals
and assumptions," 75 I believe agricultural land preservation programs
have been less than successful because they have been implemented
without fully taking into account the small farmer's "values, goals and
assumptions." Farmland preservation programs will begin to be effective
when land use decision-makers come to understand that the needs of the
small farmer are distinct from those of both large farmers and urban
dwellers.
In order to appreciate how the perspective of the small fanner differs
from that of the large, it is first necessary to understand something of the
structure of American agriculture. Roughly 80 percent of farms in the
United States are considered to be noncommercial or small farms, gen-
erating less than $40,000 in annual sales of agricultural products. 76 Yet,
in 1978, those farms accounted for only 18 percent of annual sales;77
farms with annual sales of under $5,000, about 44 percent of all farms,
generated only two percent of all sales. 78 By contrast, farms with annual
sales of $100,000 or more, roughly seven to nine percent of all farms, 79
account for over half of annual sales, while farms with $200,000 or more,
roughly two percent of all farms, account for roughly 40 percent of annual
75. Williams, PlanningLawandDemocraticLiving, 20 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 317 (1955).
76. Carr, A Profile of The Commercial Agricultural Sector, printed in FARM STRUCTURE: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CHANGES IN THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF FARMS, Senate
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1980) at
24, 26 (1974 figures); A TIME TO CHOOSE: SUMMARY REPORT ON THE STRUCTURE OF
AGRICULTURE (USDA 1981) at 43 (1978 figures) (hereinafter cited as TIME TO CHOOSE).
77. A TIME TO CHOOSE, supra note 76, at 42.
78. Id.
79. Id.; Carr, supra note 76.
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sales.8" Strikingly, farms with $1,000,000 or more in annual sales, about
one quarter of one percent of all farms, account for roughly 20 percent
of annual sales. 8 In short, agricultural production is controlled by large-
scale operators.
Thus, it is not surprising that in any one year, about 40 percent of all
farm operations show a loss 82 and that many farm families look to off-
farm income for a significant portion of total income. In fact, in only
eight percent of all farm families is farming the sole source of income.
Off-farm income exceeds farm income on those operations generating
less than $20,000 in gross sales 83-roughly 70 percent of the nation's
farms.
84
It follows that because the small farm is in the most financially pre-
carious position, it is most vulnerable to the pressures which lead to
farmland conversion.8" By contrast, agricultural preservation programs
are irrelevant to the viability of large, financially sound operations which
generate income sufficient to make continued farming worthwhile.86
The small farmer's priorities also differ from those of the urban dweller.
The latter tends to favor farmland preservation programs when they pro-
tect open spaces, recreation sites, and cheap food supplies but oppose
such programs when they begin to affect housing costs adversely or hinder
economic growth. 7 In other words, urban interests want to be able to
make the small farmer's land use choices for him.88
Predictably, small farmers oppose or fail to respond to programs which
80. Id.
81. A TIME TO CHOOSE, supra note 76, at 42.
82. Carr, supra note 76, at 29.
83. Id. at 30; A TIME TO CHOOSE, supra note 76, at 44.
84. A TIME TO CHOOSE, supra note 76, at 43.
85. See infra text accompanying notes 102-32.
86. USDA had noted that it is only when a farm generates gross sales of around $40,000 that
farm income, by itself, begins to approach an amount considered adequate for an acceptable standard
of living. A TIME TO CHOOSE, supra note 76, at 44. Given that they account for only 20% of
all farms (see supra text accompanying note 76) the fact that large operations may take advantage
of preservation programs is not an argument against their implementation as to the other 80 percent
of farmers to whom they can possibly make a difference. Instead, questions raised by the facts that
20 percent of farmers control nearly 80 percent of production (see supra text accompanying note
76) and that 30 percent of privately owned farm and ranch land is owned by 1 percent of landowners
(U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Economics, Statistics and Cooperative Service, Who Owns the Land?
(1979) at 1) go to the very heart of the structure of American agriculture and should be addressed
on that basis. See generally, Wadley, Small Farms: The USDA Rural Communities and Urban
Pressures, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 478 (1982); Farm Structure, supra note 76; A TIME TO CHOOSE,
supra note 76.
It should be noted that land farmed by agricultural tenants, but owned by investors anticipating
irresistible offers (see infra notes 159, 457, and text accompanying notes 241-44 infra), cannot
realistically be described as "preservable" in the absence of strict land use controls prohibiting
development.
87. Wadley, supra note 86, at 492-93.
88. Id.; Nellis, Planning With Rural Values, 35 J. SOIL & WATER CONSERV. 67 (1980).
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limit their choices, particularly those which threaten their ability to dis-
pose of land.
All too often a farmer's land is his or her hospitalization plan,
insurance plan, child's tuition, or personal retirement fund. Conse-
quently . . . farmers are clearly concerned about the issue of com-
pensation when land use controls are established that they perceive
as limiting their options.8 9
Programs which fail to take that concern into account will simply be
ineffective. Expressed another way, protection of agricultural land will
be most effectively achieved through a system of broad-based land use
planning that responds to the special problems of small farmers.
Using that standard as a guide, this article will examine the effectiveness
of the present patchwork of farmland preservation programs. However,
it is first essential to attain some understanding of the character of land
development in the United States, the topic to which we now turn.
LAND DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
Several factors account for the increasing development of agricultural
land.
Demographic Shifts
U.S. population is undergoing a major shift from the Frost Belt to the
Sun Belt. During the 1970s the South and West acquired 90 percent of
U.S. population growth and now possess more than half the nation's
population.' As would be expected, rural land development has followed
the demographic shift. Out of the 23.2 million acres converted from 1967-
75,91 more than half, 12 million acres, were in the South.92
In addition to the regional shift, population data revealed that for the
first time since 1920, small towns and rural areas are growing at a faster
rate than metropolitan areas. 93 During the 1970s, as the nation's popu-
lation grew by 10.5 percent, non-metropolitan areas grew by 15.4 percent;
89. Lapping, Agricultural Land Retention Strategies: Some Underpinnings, 34 J. SOIL & WATER
CONSERV. 124, 125 (1979). See also, Nellis supra note 88, Wadley, supra note 86, at 492-93.
90. Final Report, supra note 4, at 27. The Final Report by the President's Commission for the
National Agenda for the 1980's recently recommended that the federal government assist this move-
ment rather than try to stem the decline of older cities in the North and Midwest. New York Times,
Dec. 27, 1980, at Al, col 1.
91. See supra text accompanying note 4.
92. NALS defines the South as the states of West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas,
and Oklahoma. NALS, supra note 4, at 8. The Western states accounted for three million acres,
the North Central states for 5.2 million, and the Northeastern states for three million. Id. at 36.
93. Herbers, RuralAreas End Trend, Surpass Cities in Growth, New York Times, March 3, 1981,
at A14, col. 1. The figures are taken from the USDA analysis based on 1980 census data.
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metropolitan areas grew by only 9.1 percent. 94 From 1970-78, population
in the top one hundred agriculturally productive counties grew by 13.5
percent, almost double the national rate. 95
During the period from 1970-1980, 44 percent of new home construc-
tion occurred in rural areas,96 and housing in rural areas increased by 52
percent.97 More than one-third of all homes in rural America were built
from 1970-1980. 91 At the same time, however, the population of those
living on farms decreased from twenty-three million in 1950 to a mere
eight million. 99 Clearly, population shifts are playing a major role in the
conversion of farmland.
Land Speculation and Governmental Policies
It is beyond the scope of this study to examine the extent to which
regional demographic shifts are responses to economic conditions or re-
flect a generalized desire of people to live in warmer climates. On the
other hand, the urban to rural shift may be in large part a result of land
speculation and governmental policies which have failed to take into
account effects on agriculture. In enacting the Farmland Protection Policy
Act,I"u Congress recognized that federal policies have often resulted in
the unnecessary conversion of agricultural land'' and that successful
farmland preservation can occur only if the effects of those policies are
understood and the policies themselves adjusted. While the same is true
of the actions of private speculators and developers, it is impossible, and
probably unfair, to separate out their role; it will be considered along
with that of the government.
As a community begins to grow, surrounding land comes within the
area of potential expansion, and there is profit to be made from purchase
and resale or development of that land. '02 Agricultural lands are especially
vulnerable to the land development process for two reasons. First, land
with ideal farming topography is also physically easiest to develop.'0 3
More critically, while land nearest built-up areas will already have in-
94. Id.
95. Final Report, supra note 4, at 43. Thirty-three of the top 100 agricultural counties are
metropolitan, including Los Angeles and Maricopa (Phoenix). Id.
96. Id. at 25.
97. Housing Boom Hits RuralAreas, Kansas City Times, Aug. 29, 1983, at A2, col. 4.
98. Id.
99. Final Report, supra note 4, at 47.
100. Supra note 63.
101. 7 U.S.C. §4201(a)(5).
102. See Elias and Gillies, Some Observations On the Role of Speculators and Speculation in
Land Development, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 789 (1965).
103. Regional Science Research Institute, Urbanization of Prime Agricultural Lands in the United
States (1977) cited in PRESERVING AMERICA'S FARMLAND, supra note 11, at 11. Cf. Final
Report, supra note 4, at 39.
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creased in value, more distant farmland can be purchased less expensively.
Thus, in order to reduce costs, both speculators who purchase land for
resale and developers who improve the land for resale often leapfrog the
more expensive tracts in favor of the cheaper rural land."°4 At the same
time, the economics of land development-the need to recoup investments
and minimize holding costs such as interest and property taxes-en-
courage rapid development. 05 Using a residential subdivision as an ex-
ample, the speculator sells to the developer as soon as a reasonable profit
can be made, and the developer builds and sells houses as expeditiously
as possible. Each newly developed area, in turn, produces additional
leapfrogging, destroying more farmland.
Because those involved in such transactions are by definition concerned
with development, not farmland preservation, they do not consider so-
ciety's need for agricultural land. That does not mean that speculation
and development are sinister activities, but it does mean that in the end
they bring about the direct loss of large areas of prime farmland.
No less significant to the conversion process are the indirect effects
such efforts can have on surrounding land. When land comes within the
suburban influence zone in which later development is possible or prob-
able, property values and property taxes, which are based on those values,
rise."° Thus, not only must the farmer pay more for farmland that he
might wish to purchase,0 7 but his overhead expenses, in the form of
taxes, increase.
Agricultural land is converted to nonagricultural uses when farmers
succumb to the pressure and sell to those offering fair market value. This
chain of events would occur naturally on land nearest the city, but to the
extent that buyers purchase the cheapest land available, thus scattering
development throughout the rural-urban fringe, °8 urban sprawl occurs.
This phenomenon pushes up the market value of other nearby agricultural
104. Raup, supra note 44, at 374.
105. See generally, Baker, Controlling Land Uses and Prices By Using Special Gains Taxation
to Intervene in the Land Market: The Vermont Experiment, 4 ENVTL AFF. 427 (1975); Note, State
Taxation-Use of Taxing Power to Achieve Environmental Goals: Vermont Taxes Gains Realized
From the Sale or Exchange of Land Held Less Than Six Years, 49 WASH. L. REV. 1159 (1974).
106. Clawson, Urban Sprawl and Speculation in Suburban Land, 38 LAND ECON. 99, 107
(1962). In the absence of legislation to the contrary, property tax is based on a parcel's fair market
value. At the urban fringe, that figure contains a development value component since buyers,
anticipating development or resale, will pay more than the land is worth for agricultural purposes.
REGIONAL SCIENCE INSTITUTE, UNTAXING OPEN SPACE at 25-26. (Prepared for CEQ
1976). See generally infra text accompanying notes 139-43.
107. In 1975, the average agricultural value of Suffolk County, New York farmland was $1500
per acre while its average per acre selling price was $7500. Newton & Boast, Preservation By
Contract: Public Purchase of Development Rights in Farmland, 4 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 189, 211
(1978).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 102-106.
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land, putting pressure on its owners, eventually generating more urban
sprawl. "Urban sprawl, then, tends to produce more sprawl."'"
The problem is magnified when public services are extended to the
developing or developable areas; the probability of development (or greater
development) significantly increases, land becomes even more valuable,
and taxes rise even higher."' A new sewer, for example, will attract
development that might otherwise have occurred on available urban sites.'
Since governmental units are normally responsible for the extension of
services, it is in this sphere that official policies often compound the
action of speculators and developers.
For example, EPA administers a multi-billion dollar grant program for
sewage treatment plant construction as part of its mandate to promote
clean water." 2 However, the new sewers also serve as "magnets for
growth""' 3 which might not have occurred prior to the program, when
local goverments were responsible for building such facilities.'. " Thus,
in fighting pollution the government unfortunately has subsidized sprawl." 5
Moreover, government programs compound each other.
EPA inadvertently encourages rural subdivisions by limiting the amount
of additional sewers and sewage treatment facilities in built-up areas.
Then Farmers Home Administration provides money for the rural
109. Dunford, A Survey of Property Tax Relief Programs for the Retention of Agricultural and
Open Space Lands, 15 GONZ. L. REV. 675, 683 (1980).
110. Clawson, supra note 106.
111. Anthan, How U.S. Policies Help Gobble Up The Farmland, Des Moines Register, July 12,
1979.
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1281-92.
113. Anthan, supra note 111 (quoting J. Gustafson, an EPA official).
114. Id.
115. Id. Other governmental programs bring about similar results. In Lincoln County, South
Dakota, near Sioux Falls, the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) helped finance a rural water
system to provide water for area farmers. But in the three years following its installation, nonfarm
housing starts increased 300%. (Id.) (from an interview with T. Jacobson, senior planner from Sioux
Falls.) Another FmHA program recently accounted for the loss of 150 acres in Lewis and Clark
County, Montana. The development occurred seven miles from Helena, on land not likely to have
been developed without an FmHA loan, qualification for which required a location at least five miles
from the City. Final Report, supra note 4, at 49-50.
(As previously stated, federal law now provides that state or local government projects receiving
FmHA loans be located, whenever possible, on non-prime farmland. Private parties using FmHA
loans for projects involving prime farmland will be assessed a two percent annual interest penalty.)
Supra note 68.
Similarly, Harris County, Texas, surrounding Houston, contains approximately 500,000 acres of
agricultural land. NALS estimates that Housing and Urban Development (HUD) programs contributed
to the conversion of 13,000 acres of mostly prime land in 1978, about 11,300 acres in 1979, and
about 4,700 acres in 1980. Id. at 32. "While Harris County housing may have increased without
HUD-administered loan guarantees, NALS research suggests that HUD programs played an important
role in facilitating that growth." Id. at 49. See also, Preserving America's Farmland, supra note
11, at 35-40.
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sewer and water facilities. Then come housing subsidies, followed
by more roads to serve the increased population, and then subsidies
that bring industries and businesses along the roads." 6
The point is not that such programs constitute bad social policy, but
that they have unwittingly destroyed agricultural land. It is hoped that
the Farmland Protection Policy Act, which now directs federal agencies
to evaluate the impact of their activities upon agricultural land," 7 will
greatly reduce federally encouraged conversion of farmland. However,
as previously noted, the act clearly leaves it to state and local governments
to develop preservation programs."' While the federal government's will-
ingness to cooperate should be a catalyst, the farmland conversion prob-
lem will be solved only through state and local planning.
Problems of Farm Management
The conversion of agricultural land in an area may, in turn, affect the
farmer's ability or desire to continue farming.
At the urbanfrural fringe, where development potential has increased
the value of the land, the farmer never knows when he will be offered
an irresistible price for his land. "9 A sort of "Impermanence Syndrome" 
20
is created; farmers are reluctant to make necessary investments or re-
pairs,' 2' and they may decide against purchasing land with which to
expand their operations. In turn, the level of farm service businesses,
such as equipment dealerships, may decline as they become less profit-
able,' thus further weakening the farming environment.
In addition, as agricultural areas become residential, tensions develop
between farmers and suburbanites. Suits seeking to declare feedlots to
116. Anthan, supra note Ill (quoting G. Fisher, a supervisor in Albemarle County, Virginia).
Another commentator suggests that government subsidizes urban sprawl in the following ways:
1) the financing of highways in part with a gasoline tax based on distance travelled; 2) FHA and
VA loan programs which encourage new housing starts over the use of apartments; 3) income tax
deductions for home interest payments; 4) the use of tax exempt municipal bonds to extend gov-
ernment services; and 5) average cost pricing of public services (as opposed to marginal cost pricing),
whereby the center city is forced to pay for suburban development. Raup, supra note 44, at 372-
374.
NALS notes that 15% of the federal programs having moderate to substantial effects on agriculture
have budgets greater than one billion dollars, and 65% have budgets in excess of $100 million.
Final Report, supra note 4, at 48.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71, 73-74.
119. Clawson, supra note 106.
120. Final Report, supra note 4, at 50.
121. Id. Clawson, supra note 106, compares these farmers to sharecroppers in the South who
were afraid to invest in an enterprise they might soon lose.
122. Clawson, supra note 106; Final Report, supra note 4, at 44; Anthan, Farmers, City Dwellers
Sometimes Tense Neighbors, Des Moines Register, July 11, 1979.
[Vol. 24
PRESERVATION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND
be nuisances have been common for years," 3 but farmers today increas-
ingly are confronted with homeowners' complaints about slow-moving
vehicles, with environmental restrictions such as bans on burning, or with
pets that disturb livestock. 24 Conversely, nonfarm residents are exposed
to the effects of chemical pesticides and to unpleasant barnyard odors."Z
A substantial number of states have responded with Right-to-Farm
laws'26 which seek to limit actions against normal agricultural activities.127
Such statutes may, in some instances, only codify common law nuisance
doctrine,' but they do clearly express a policy of protecting agriculture.
They have not, however, put an end to nuisance actions, 9 which have
been estimated to cost a farmer between $15,000 and $20,000 to defend. 130
As a result of these sociological factors, some farmers may decide to
cease their operations. 3 ' Worse still, frustration may run so deeply that
some will "mine" the soil with high intensity crops before leaving. 13 2
NALS predicts that "socio-demographic factors and federal program
activities will continue to bring farm and nonfarm uses of agricultural
123. E.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972); Dill
v. Excel Packing Co., 183 Kan. 513, 331 P.2d 539 (1958). See also O'Malley, Good Right-to-Farm
Laws Make Good Neighbors, RURAL ELECTRIFICATION 18-22 (January 1982).
124. Anthan, supra note 122.
125. Id.
126. Thompson, Defining and Protecting the Right to Farm, 5 ZONING AND PLANNING L.
REP. 57-63, 65-70 (Sept.-Oct. 1982). See also NALS, THE PROTECTION OF FARMLAND, A
REFERENCE GUIDEBOOK FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, 98-103 (1981) (here-
inafter Guidebook).
127. The Kansas Statute, enacted in 1982, reads as follows:
Section 1. It is the declared policy of this state to conserve and protect and
encourage the development and improvement of farmland for the production of food
and other agricultural products. The legislature finds that agricultural activities con-
ducted on farmland in areas in which nonagricultural uses have moved into agri-
cultural areas are often subjected to nuisance lawsuits, and that such suits encourage
and even force the premature removal of the lands from agricultural uses. It is
therefore the purpose of this act to provide agricultural activities conducted on
farmland protection from nuisance lawsuits.
Sec. 2. Agricultural activities conducted on farmland, if consistent with good
agricultural practices and established prior to surrounding nonagricultural activities,
are presumed to be reasonable and do not constitute a nuisance, public or private,
unless the activity has a substantial adverse effect on the public health and safety.
If such agricultural activity is undertaken in conformity with federal, state, and
local laws and regulations, it is presumed to be good agricultural practice and not
adversely affecting the public health and safety.
1982 Kan. Sess. Laws Ch. 3.
128. Thompson, supra note 126, at 59.
129. See e.g., Herrin v. Opatut, 248 Ga. 140, 281 S.E.2d 575 (1981).
130. The Drover's Journal (Sept. 13, 1979) as noted in Hearings on S. 485 before the Kansas
House Committee on Agriculture and Livestock (March 18, 1982) (Statement of Brad Avery, Admin.
Asst. to Sen. Talkington).
131. For the story of one farmer who, because of a nuisance action, was forced to sell out, see
O'Malley, supra note 123.
132. Final Report, supra note 4, at 44.
January 1984]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
land into competition throughout this century."' 33 While that prediction
was issued prior to passage of the Farmland Protection Policy Act, that
act represents only a starting point for agricultural land use planning.
There appears to be no reason to question NALS's conclusion that while
the pressures may not be as great over the next twenty years as they have
over the past twenty, "the process of economic growth and development
in rural areas is not expected to change significantly in the near future."1 34
The programs that have been devised to counter farmland conversion
have responded to one or more of these specific problems discussed
above.' 35 As previously stated, this article's purpose is to evaluate those
programs and to suggest that their effectiveness would be enhanced through
the use of broad-based land use planning. The types of programs surveyed
are: 1) preferential taxation, 2) agricultural districting, 3) agricultural
zoning, 4) purchase of development rights (PDR), and 5) transfer of
development rights (TDR). It will be seen that these programs utilize
increasing degrees of planning and achieve increasing levels of success.
Moreover, even within each type of program, effectiveness depends on
the level of planning.
PREFERENTIAL TAXATION
Beginning with Maryland in 1956, 48 states'36 have granted tax relief
to farmers, primarily through the use of preferential ad valorem tax
assessment for agricultural land. Since most state constitutions mandate
uniform taxation, amendments permitting preferential treatment have been
required.' 37 Although such measures are exceedingly popular as a means
of tax reduction, 138 they have been particularly ineffective as a means of
conserving agricultural land.
133. Id. at 51.
134. Id.
135. Other concerns, while important, are beyond the principal scope of this article. For example,
the development of open lands may have negative repercussions for water quality. "Open lands
protect the hydrologic integrity of watersheds by controlling storm water runoff and sediment drain-
age, and they protect aquifer recharge areas and serve as buffers for water supply.... CEQ 9th
Annual Report 270 (1978).
Aquifers are further endangered by the construction of subdivisions relying on septic tanks for
waste disposal. A survey in one Oregon county in the early 1970's showed that 562 out of 1,005
developer-platted lots were unsuitable for planned septic tanks because of size, topography, soil
quality, high water table or adverse slope. Hearings on S. 268 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. Part II 9 (1973) (statement of Hon. Tom. McCall, Gov.
of Oregon).
136. Georgia and Kansas are the only states which have not enacted such a program. Kansas has
amended its constitution to permit such legislation, however. Kans. Const. art. 11, § 12.
137. Keene, supra note 8, at 658.
138. Tax reduction is concededly a primary goal of such systems. "In many states, this appears
to have been the only, or at least, the overriding goal." UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note
106, at 22.
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The Problem
Farmland in a rural area has a value based upon its capitalized agri-
cultural earning power. In determining that value, factors such as soil
quality, topography, and commodity prices are taken into account. 39 Since
farming is that land's highest and best use, property taxes will be assessed
on that agricultural value. "° By contrast, farmland within a suburban
influente zone is vulnerable to conversion and consequently possesses an
additional development value, equalling the difference between its fair
market value for development purposes and its agricultural use value.' 4 '
For example, in 1975, land in Suffolk County, New York was worth
$1,500 per acre for agricultural purposes but, because of its proximity
to New York City, had an average selling price of $7,500 per acre. 4 '
Thus, its development value was $6,000 per acre. Since the land's highest
and best use was for development, property taxes would have been as-
sessed on the sum of the two values,'43 $7,500 in the above example.
In addition, the tax rate on developable land often will be effectively
higher than on purely agricultural land because of the need to pay for
government services which have been extended.'"
The combined result of these factors is that farmers at the urban fringe
pay a larger portion of the same income in property taxes than do farmers
in rural areas. 45 This differential is in addition to the larger percentage
of their income that farmers in general pay, compared to city dwellers,
because of the land intensive nature of their operations. 46
As previously discussed, agricultural land is converted to nonagricul-
tural use when farmers, no longer able or willing to withstand the pressure,
139. Keene, Differential Assessment and The Preservation of Open Space, 14 URB. L. ANN.
11, 15 (1977). The article is an adaptation and updating of UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note
106.
140. Keene, supra note 139, at 14.
141. Id. at 25.
142. Supra note 107.
143. Keene, supra note 139, at 25-26.
144. Id. at 14; GLOUDEMANS, USE VALUE FARMLAND ASSESSMENTS: THEORY, PRAC-
TICE AND IMPACT 11 (1974).
145. Compare two such farmers, both with net incomes of $7,500. The rural farmer, whose land
has an agricultural use value of $30,000 and an effective tax rate of one percent, pays $300, or four
percent of his income, in tax. The urban fringe farmer, whose land also has an agricultural use of
$30,000 but a fair market value of $100,000, and an effective tax rate of two percent, pays $2,000,
or 28% of his income in tax. Gloudemans, supra note 144, at 10-11.
146. In 1971, farmers paid 7.6% of their income in real property taxes, up from 5.7% in 1961.
The nation as a whole paid 4.4% in 1971, up from 4.3% in 1961. Hady & Sibold, State Programs
for the Differential Assessment of Farm and Open Space Land, U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Econ.
Research Service, Ag. Econ. Rep. 256 at 7 (1974).
In some states the percentage is well above average. E.g., in 1972 farmers in New York paid
31% of their income in taxes; in Pennsylvania, 21.6%; in Illinois, 14.2%. Gloudemans, supra note
144, at 10. In New Jersey farmers paid 55.9% of their income in property taxes in 1972, up from
5.9% in 1950. KOLESAR & SCHOLL, SAVING FARMLAND 3 (1975).
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sell to those offering amounts in excess of use value.' 47 Tax relief pro-
grams, which reduce overhead costs, are an attempt to give the farmer
an incentive-increased profits-to resist development pressure.
General Provisions of Tax Relief Programs'48
The various programs define agricultural lands to cover a full range of
generally understood agricultural uses. 49 A number of states provide relief
for forest or timber land,'50 although some require that such lands be used
for growing and harvesting wood products.' 5' Other programs extend
benefits to open land,' 52 recreational lands,' 53 and wild lands.' 54 To avoid
needless complexity, future references to agricultural uses will include
all eligible uses.
In addition, some states require a minimum number of acres, 5 a
minimum agricultural income,'56 a minimum history of agricultural use,
57
or a conservation management program.'58 Finally, to ensure that non-
farmer speculators are unable to take advantage of the relief, at least one
state, Texas, provides that the owner must be a natural person whose
primary occupation and source of income is agriculture. 5
9
147. See supra text accompanying notes 106-109. See generally UNTAXING OPEN SPACE,
supra note 106.
148. For a state by state listing of features see Keene, supra note 139, at 17-23; see generally
UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 106 at 14-19.
149. E.g., the most recently enacted statute, that of Mississippi, defines agricultural land as
"devoted to the commercial production of crops and other commercial products of the soil, including
but not limited to the production of fruits and timber or the raising of livestock and poultry." MISS.
CODE ANN. § 27-35-50 (Supp. 1981).
150. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-107(b) (West Supp. 1972-1981); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 47:2307(c)(West Supp. 1982).
151. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-277.2(2)(1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84:34.020(3)
(Supp. 1982). Some states have separate forest taxation laws, e.g., Western Oregon Small Tract
Optional Tax, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 321.705-.765 (1981).
152. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-107(b)(c) (West Supp. 1972-81); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 79-A:2 (VII) (Supp. 1981).
153. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. §273.112 (West Supp. 1982); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §79-
A:2(X) (Supp. 1981).
154. E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §79-A:2 (XIII)'(Supp. 1981).
155. E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. §71.09(1 1) (West Supp. 1981) 35 or more acres; WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 84.34.020(2) (Supp. 1982) 20 acres or more. Parcels of less than 20 acres have an
additional past agricultural income requirement. Id.
States which provide for the formation of agricultural districts by definition have acreage require-
ments. See e.g., N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 303 (McKinney Supp. 1981) (500 acres).
156. E.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 137.017 (Vernon Supp. 1982), $2,500 per year for the preceding
five years; S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 10-6-31.3(1)(Supp. 1981), one-third of the total family
gross income or $2,500 in three of the preceding five years.
157. Id.
158. E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 91.35 (Supp. 1981), district conservation plan required; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 105-277.2 (1979), "sound management program" required.
159. Tex. Const. art. 8, § 1-d(a)(Vemon Supp. 1981). Such abuses have occurred in New Jersey
where developers have purchased land and leased it back to farmers, thereby reducing their holding
costs until they are ready to develop. See Kolesar & Scholl, Misplaced Hopes, Misspent Millions:
A Report on Farmland Assessment in New Jersey. PRINCETON: CENTER FOR ANALYSIS OF
PUBLIC ISSUES (1972).
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Determination of Relief
Use Value. The vast majority of tax relief programs assess eligible
farmland at its current or agricultural use value, instead of at its fair
market value, and are thus known as differential assessment systems. Use
value is determined by one of two methods: reference to soil productivity
or capitalization of income. 60
States utilizing productivity-based assessment establish values for var-
ious categories of land quality. For example, under the Indiana program,
land capable of producing over 75 bushels of corn and over 35 bushels
of wheat per acre receives the highest rating. Land capable of producing
60-75 bushels of corn and 30-35 bushels of wheat receives a lower
rating. 6' To calculate use value, assessors determine the productivity of
a given tract and then multiply the specified value by the number of acres.
While the method has the advantage of simplicity, it is subject to criticism
for failure to take into account other facts, "such as location, accessibility,
and differential suitability for different kinds of crops." 62
Capitalization of income is by far the most popular method of differ-
ential assessment. 63 Under such a system, the land's income producing
potential, usually measured by its net rental value for agricultural pur-
poses,'" is capitalized to obtain its use value. 65 While capitalization
perhaps provides a more accurate value than productivity rating, it is
administratively more burdensome due to the volume of data required."
Moreover, the choice of capitalization rate will greatly affect the value
obtained. 67
160. A third method, comparison to sales of comparable land, is seldom used since such purchase
prices often contain development value components. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE supra note 106,
at 34.
161. See e.g., STATE BD. OF TAX COMM'RS., INDIANA REAL ESTATE PROPERTY AP-
PRAISAL MANUAL, Regulation 17 (1968)(reprinted in UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note
106, at 37).
162. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE supra note 106, at 36.
163. Id. at 35-36.
164. E.g., "... . fair rent which can be imputed to the land being valued based upon rent actually
received for the land by the owner and upon typical rentals received in the area for similar land in
similar use, with the owner paying the property tax." Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 423(a)(l)(West Supp.
1981). Rental values may be inappropriate in areas where developers have bought up land and leased
it back to farmers at less than the market rental value. While such transactions show little profit,
they reduce holding costs since the land qualifies for differential assessment. UNTAXING OPEN
SPACE, supra note 106, at 35. See generally, Kolesar & Scholl, supra note 159.
165. The net rental value is divided by the sum of the effective property tax rate and a capitalization
rate. Dunford, supra note 109, at 683. See generally, UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 106,
at 57.
The effective property tax rate is the "percentage which the tax is of fair market value." Keene,
supra note 139, at 32. "Capitalization rates vary considerably from state to state, and from year to
year, because they are often set administratively in accordance with legislative criteria." Id. E.g.,
the Oregon capitalization rate is the average effective rate of interest charged in Oregon by the
Federal Land Bank for farm properties over the past five years, plus the component for the local
tax rate. OR. REV. STAT. § 308.345(3) (1979).
166. See Dunford, supra note 109, at 683.
167. A capitalization rate of 10% will yield a use value of half that obtained from a five percent
rate. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 106, at 39.
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Classified Property Ratios. A number of states use classified property
tax systems which establish assessment ratios for various categories of
property. For example, Tennessee farm property is assessed at 25 percent
of its value,168 Arizona farm property at 16 percent.' 69 These states gen-
erally assign to agricultural land rates lower than those for commercial
land, 7' but agricultural landowners are generally treated no differently
than residential landowners.' 7 More importantly, since the ratios are tied
to fair market value, they are of comparatively little benefit to vulnerable
urban fringe farmers; their taxes increase with the development value of
the land.' 72 "In general, the primary intent of a classified system appears
to be the granting of a differentially low assessment to homeowners in
general, whereas use-value farmland assessments are intended more as
tax relief measures for farmers in particular." 1
73
Circuit Breakers. Two states, Michigan and Wisconsin, have adopted
tax preference systems that do not directly reduce ad valorem taxes.
Instead, farmers receive income tax credits for property taxes which
amount to more than a specified percentage of household income.' 74 In
Michigan, eligibility is based on the execution of an agreement restricting
the property to agricultural use; 75 in Wisconsin, the amount of the credit
varies with the degree of zoning and planning adopted by the local gov-
erning unit.'76 "[B]ecause they are based on the farmer's net income
rather than just one element (property tax) which affects his net income,"
the programs are more directly aimed at the farmers' financial plight than
the other tax relief schemes. 17
Types of Programs
Within the general categories there exist four basic types of tax relief
programs: pure differential assessment, deferred taxation, those requiring
restrictive agreements, and those mandating zoning or planning. 78 From
168. TENN. CODEANN. §67-611 (1976).
169. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-136, -227 (1980).
170. E.g., in Arizona agricultural land is assessed at 16%, commercial land at 25%. Id.
171. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-611 (1976); W. VA. CODE § 11-8-5 (1974).
172. Gloudemans, supra note 144, at 23.
173. Id. at 24.
174. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 26.1287(10) (Supp. 1982); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 71.09(11) (West
Supp. 1981). Both statutes also provide credits to partnership and corporate owners who can dem-
onstrate a history of agricultural use.
175. MIUCH. COMP. LAWS, §26.1287(10) (Supp. 1982).
176. See infra, text accompanying notes 205-21.
177. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 19.
178. Dunford, supra note 109, at 685 is unique in discussing the fourth category, based primarily
on the new Wisconsin statute. Earlier works discuss only the first three. See generally, UNTAXING
OPEN SPACE supra note 106.
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the farmer's perspective, the systems progressively restrict the benefits
he receives; from the planner's perspective, they progressively encourage
farmland preservation.
Pure Differential Assessment
Seventeen states have pure differential assessment programs which
simply assess land at use value. ' 79 Tax relief follows automatically from
ownership of eligible land, and no portion of the tax savings is required
to be repaid if the land is converted to a non-eligible use. Under such a
system, pure tax reduction is the landowner's only incentive to resist
development pressure.
Deferred Taxation
Twenty-eight states utilize a system of tax deferral for eligible land. 8 0
As with pure differential assessment, relief follows automatically from
ownership and, so long as it remains eligible, land is taxed only on its
use value. However, upon its conversion, some of the tax savings must
be repaid in the form of rollback taxes. Rollback periods are set by statute
and vary from two'.. to ten years. 8 2 Most such statutes provide that two
sets of data be kept on eligible land: information to permit collection of
the tax owing at use value assessment as well as the tax that would be
owing at fair market value assessment. The rollback tax is simply the
difference between the two amounts for the years the land received the
tax benefit, subject to the statutory maximum.'83 A sizeable number of
states charge interest on the amount of the rollback'84 and, in some, an
additional penalty may be assessed for failure to comply with procedural
requirements.' 85 In order to avoid the cumbersome record keeping de-
scribed above, some states simply levy a conveyence tax when land is
converted from an eligible to non-eligible use.86
179. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 57.
180. Id. See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §54:4-23.8 (Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. §308.395
(1979).
181. E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 132.450, 454 (Baldwin 1982).
182. E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 246-10(0(3) (Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 308.395(1) (1981).
183. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. §308.395(1) (1981).
184. Six percent is the typical rate (UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 106, at 69) although
in some states the rate is as high as ten percent. HAW. REV. STAT. §246-10(f)(3) (Supp. 1981).
185. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 308.395(2) (1981). In Washington, the penalty amounts to 20%
of the rollback tax. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 84.34.080 (Supp. 1982).
186. E.g., in New Hampshire the tax amounts to 10% of the fair market value of the property.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-A: 7 (Supp. 1979). In Maine the amount varies with the length of
time the land has received tax benefits. ME. REV. STAT. TIT. 36, § 1112 (1964).
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Restrictive Agreements
Another small group of states require that, in order to qualify for
differential assessment, farmers enter into agreements restricting the use
of their land to eligible purposes.187
California's Land Conservation Act, the Williamson Act,'88 probably
the most widely known of all land preservation plans, illustrates the
operation of such a system. Owners of agricultural land, located in a
designated agricultural preserve, may contract with the city or county to
restrict the land to agricultural use. 89 Such contracts may be enforced by
either party by any action, including one for specific performance, 90 and
are binding on successors in interest. 191
The contracts have minimum ten year terms and are automatically
renewed each year unless notice of nonrenewal is given by either party.192
A nonrenewed contract remains in force for the nine year remainder of
the term,193 but the assessed valuation is recomputed each year until it
reaches fair market value in the last year. 19'
A landowner may petition for cancellation of the contract' 95 but must
show that cancellation is "consistent with the act" or "is in the public
interest." 96 The "uneconomic character" of the existing agricultural use
187. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 106, at 19.
188. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51200-51295 (West Supp. 1982).
189. Id. § 51201(b), (d), § 51230, § 51240. The Act also covers recreational land, scenic highway
corridors, wildlife habitats, saltponds, managed wetlands and submerged areas. Id. § 51205.
The establishment of agricultural preserves is but one feature of a broad-based land planning
system. Counties are required to develop general use plans which include provisions for the pres-
ervation of open space, which includes agricultural land. Cal. Govt. Code § 65302, § 65560 et seq.
(West Supp. 1966-80). Any action regulating or restricting open space land must be consistent with
the open space plan, and proposals for preserves must be initially submitted to the county planning
department. Id. § 65556, § 51234. Finally, within two years of the designation of a preserve, all
noncontracted land must be zoned for agriculture. Id. § 51230.
190. Id. § 51251.
191. Id. §51243.
192. Id. § 51244.193. Id. § 51246.
194. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §426 (West Supp. 1982).
195. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51280 (West Supp. 1982).
196. Id. § 51282. The California Supreme Court construed the Williamson Act for the first time
in Sierra Club v. City of Haywood, 28 Cal.3d 840, 171 Cal. Rptr. 619, 623 P.2d 180 (1981). The
court held that nonrenewal is the ordinary method of terminating contracts and that cancellation is
appropriate only in the "most extraordinary circumstances." 171 Cal. Rptr. at 625. The "public
interest" refers not just to the interests of a particular community but to the interest of the public
as a whole in the value of land for agriculture and open space. Id. at 627. That public interest must
be "substantially outweighed" by other public concerns for cancellation to be appropriate. Id. at
688.
In response to that decision, the California legislature enacted amendments to the Williamson Act.
1981 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 1095 (West). The amendments provide a one-time opportunity for
landowners to cancel contracts on grounds different than those generally applicable. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 51282.1 (West Supp. 1982). See FARMLAND, Newsletter of the American Farmland Trust,
March, 1982 at 1.
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will not, by itself, constitute sufficient reason for cancellation and may
be considered only if there is no other reasonable or comparable agri-
cultural use to which the property can be put.'97 Potential alternate uses
will be considered only if there is no nearby noncontracted land available
and suitable for the proposed use, or if development of the contracted
land would provide more continuous patterns of development than the
development of nearby noncontracted land. '98 Deferred taxes are assessed
based on a statutory formula,' 99 and a cancellation fee amounting to 12.5
percent of the land's fair market value is charged,2" although both may
be waived under certain conditions."
Mandatory Zoning and Planning
In three states tax relief is dependent upon prior zoning and/or planning.
Since the Hawaii2 2 and Oregon2'3 measures are components of more
comprehensive statewide land use programs meriting separate discussion,
this article will focus on the Wisconsin scheme.
The Wisconsin Farmland Preservation Law2 4 is divided into two stages.
Under phase I, 1977-82, farmers meeting the acreage, income, and con-
servation eligibility requirements received an income tax credit by signing
an agreement containing a covenant not to develop the land.205 All such
agreements expired at the end of phase one, September 30, 1982. Under
phase two, tax credits depend upon the degree of local government plan-
ning and land use control. Counties and towns are not required to act,
but no credits are available unless they do so.2°'
In urban counties, land must be zoned exclusively for agriculture in
order to be eligible for credits; subject to exceptions for parents and
children of the farm operator, residences must be restricted to those
earning a substantial portion of their livelihood from the parcel.20 7 The
197. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51282(d) (West Supp. 1982).
198. Id. §51282(b), (c).
199. Id. §51283.1.
200. Id. § 51283(a)(b). Mix, Restricted Use Assessment in California: Can It Fulfill Its Objec-
tives?, 11 SANTA CLARA LAW. 259, 264 (1971).
201. CAL. GOV'T CODE §51283(c), §51283.1(e)(West Supp. 1982).
202. HAW. REV. STAT. § 246-12 (1976 and Supp. 1981).
203. OR. REV. STAT. §308.370 (1981).
204. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 91.01 et seq. (West Supp. 1981).
205. Id. § 91.13, § 91.31, § 71.01(1 1). Under a phase one agreement the land received 50% of
the maximum tax credit. Id. § 71.09(11).
206. Wisconsin's Farmland Preservation Program. Extension Bull. G2890 at 2. Madison: Univ.
of Wisconsin-Extension (1979). In addition, farmers with land in those counties and towns would
be required to pay back the last two years' credits received under Stage I. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 91.37
(West Supp. 1981). If the land is eligible for credits under a phase In restrictive agreement but the
farmer chooses not to participate, all past credits must be repaid, with interest from 1982. Id.
207. WIS. STAT. ANN. §91.11(b)(3), §91.75 (West Supp. 1981).
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tract then receives 70 percent of the maximum credit.2°8 If the county has
also developed an agricultural preservation plan, land is eligible for the
maximum credit.2' Briefly, such plans will contain statements of policy
regarding "preservation of agricultural lands, urban growth, the provision
of public facilities and the protection of significant natural resources,
open space, scenic, historic or architectural areas;"21 and a general de-
scription of the land use controls and programs needed to implement those
policies. E1 They will be based in part on maps, proposed by the state
department of agriculture, which locate lands which, because of their
agricultural significance, should be considered for preservation.212
Rural counties must adopt either a preservation plan or agricultural
zoning in order for farmers to receive tax credits.213 Farmers with land
in an exclusive agricultural zone automatically receive a 70 percent credit;2"4
if the county also develops a preservation plan, they become eligible for
a one hundred percent credit.215 If the county has only a preservation
plan, execution of an agreement not to develop will entitle the farmer to
a 70 percent credit.2"6 Any land, urban or rural, which is covered by
zoning or restrictive agreement is exempt from special assessment for
governmental services."'
Tax credits are available only as long as the land remains in agricultural
use. Wisconsin farmers who seek "relinquishment" of an agreement not
to develop must show economic hardship which prevents necessary im-
provement to the land, significant and generally irreversible physical
changes in the land, or that surrounding conditions prohibit agricultural
use. The possibility that an alternative use would provide a greater return
is not a sufficient reason to cancel.218 If an agreement is relinquished prior
to its termination date, or is not renewed, credits received over the pre-
vious ten years must be repaid.219
Similarly, agricultural land which is rezoned at the owner's request is
liable for repayment.220 Inexplicably, given the act's otherwise strong
agricultural bent, the factors to be considered prior to rezoning are re-
208. Id. §71.09(11).
209. Id. § 71.09(1 1)(b)3a.; Wisconsin's Farmland Preservation Program, supra note 206.
210. Id. § 91.55.
211. Id. §*91.57.
212. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 91.05, 91.55 (West Supp. 1981).
213. Wisconsin's Farmland Preservation Program, supra note 206.
214. Id.; WIS. STAT. ANN. §91.71-79, §71.09(l1)(b)3e.
215. Id. §71.09(l1)(b)3a.
216. Id. § 91.1 1(b)(2), § 71.09(11). Wisconsin's Farmland Preservation Program, supra note 206.
217. Id. §91.15.
218. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 91.19 (West Supp. 1981).
219. Id. § 91.19.
220. Id. § 91.77(2):
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flective of urban planning concerns, i.e., whether public facilities will
adequately accommodate development.22
General Observations on Effectiveness222
As a general proposition tax relief programs have failed to preserve
farmland. While escalating property tax may be a factor in a farmer's
decision to convert his land to a nonagricultural use, it is unlikely to be
the sole factor. The economics of farming are dependent not only on
operational costs, of which property tax is only one, but also upon such
factors as commodity prices. Moreover, tax relief provides too little in-
centive for farmers who own vulnerable lands near the urban fringe to
resist development pressure. In those areas, the difference between use
value and market value is the greatest; the possible gains from conversion
simply outweigh the possible tax savings. For example, in Contra Costa
County, California, bordering San Francisco Bay on the northeast, the
1971 average cash rent for farmland in the agriculturally rich eastern
sections of the county was $60 to $120 per acre, whereas the average
sale price was $3,000 per acre.223 With such profit to be made, farmers
in that area have been unwilling to sign agreements restricting their ability
to sell land for nonagricultural purposes, even though that refusal means
foregoing tax relief.
224
Demographic and sociological factors also play an important role in a
decision to convert; a farmer who wants to retire at a time when an
agricultural buyer is not available is likely to sell his land to the highest
bidder.' Confrontations with nonfarmer residents or a decline in thelevel of farm support services226 may also influence a decision to sell out.
221. Rezoning may occur only after findings based on the following considerations are made:
(a) Adequate public faciltities to accommodate development either exist or will be provided within
a reasonable time;
(b) Provisions of public facilities to accommodate development will not place an unreasonable
burden on the ability of affected local units of government to provide them;
(c) The land proposed for rezoning is suitable for development and development will not result
in undue water or air pollution, cause unreasonable soil erosion or have an adverse effect on rare
or irreplaceable natural areas.
Id. § 91.77(1).
222. This article will not address the "tax shift" which may accompany use value assessment.
If the level of governmental services is to remain constant as the assessment base is decreased, tax
rates must increase. Hence tax burdens are often "shifted" to nonfarm properties. In a primarily
rural area, however, even the farmer may pay higher taxes.
See generally, Gloudemans, supra note 144, ch. 3; UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 106,
at 80-99.
223. Comment, The California Land Conservation Act of1965And The Fight To Save California's
Prime Agricultural Lands, 30 HASTINGS L. J. 1859, 1877, n. 90 (1979).
224. Id. at 1875.
225. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 106, at 49.
226. See supra, text accompanying notes 118-32.
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Thus, in general, "except for interdependencies among the reasons for
selling, reduction of agricultural property tax will have little or no impact
on [the other factors] in the decision to sell. 227 Tax relief programs are
thus effective "only in terms of the small number of farmers who are
contemplating sale in a given year and who are potentially susceptible to
being influenced by a reduction of their property taxes.
28
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, tax relief programs have been
ineffective because public input into land use decision-making is totally
absent. Because decisions are left completely to the private sector, the
public's interest in preserving farmland necessarily yields to the financial
concerns of both investors, whose livelihood depends on development,
and farmers, whose economic well-being is dependent on being able to
sell their land.
Analysis
The following sections will examine the above conclusions in depth
and consider whether, given their limited potential, one taxation system
preserves more agricultural land than another.
Pure Differential Assessment.
Little amplification of the above comments is necessary in evaluating
pure differential assessment systems. Although the benefits may finan-
cially assist some owners who want to continue farming, the absence of
a rollback tax or penalty upon conversion simply allows farmers "to
postpone sale until a time which fits more appropriately into their own
life plans '2 or until the irresistible offer comes along. In short, to owners
amenable to conversion, the possible gains far outweigh tax savings.
Perhaps the strongest commentary on pure differential assessment comes
from the Florida experience. While this system was used for agricultural
land,23 when the state later decided to protect outdoor recreation and
park lands, restrictive agreements were required.2 '
Deferred Taxation.
Although the presence of a rollback tax, or a penalty, may cause an
owner to pause and reflect before converting his land, deferred taxation
systems are not significantly more effective at preserving farmland than
pure differential assessment systems. States that impose no interest charge
227. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 106, at 52.
228. Id. at 65-66.
229. Id. at 66.
230. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.461 (1980).
231. Id. § 193.501.
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simply make the farmer an interest free loan, and the rollback period
often does not even cover the full benefit period.232 Significantly, deferred
taxation is least likely to inhibit development at the vulnerable urban
fringe where possible profits far outweigh back taxes. Since "[tihe size
of the penalty depends on the divergence of market value from use value,
the larger the potential rollback tax penalty, the larger [also] the potential
capital gains associated with sale or land use conversion." 233 In addition,
appreciation in fair market value at the urban fringe will more than offset
rollback taxes. Even in states which charge interest, the total penalty is
likely to be no more than 10 to 12 percent of the market value, not enough
to serve as a significant obstacle to conversion. 4 Since that percentage
drops as the rate of appreciation increases,235 the most rapidly appreciating
lands, those under the most development pressure, will be subject to the
smallest rollbacks and therefore more vulnerable to conversion.
Finally, deferred taxation fails because the threat of rollback charges
probably makes high quality farmland more susceptible to conversion
than low or medium quality land. As the quality of land and its use value
assessment increase, the difference between use value and market value
decreases, making it subject to a smaller rollback and thus more vulner-
able."26
New Jersey. A brief examination of the New Jersey Farmland Assess-
ment Act, which imposes a two year rollback without interest,237 confirms
the above conclusions. A study of the early effects of the New Jersey act
conducted among several hundred farmers revealed the following:
43 percent of program participants who had sold land had done
so to obtain capital gain; only 27 percent had done so because farming
was not profitable.
Of those who had declined offers to sell, 57 percent had done so
because of a desire to continue farming; 43 percent would have sold
"with or without the Farmland Assessment Act if the price had been
'right.'
When asked if program participation had influenced their land use
decision, 60 percent said "no;" when asked if it would affect future
such decisions, 78 percent said "no." ' "
232. See supra, text accompanying notes 181-82.
233. Gloudemans, supra note 144, at 41.
234. UNTAXING OPEN SPACE, supra note 106, at 73. The percentage is similar in states that
charge a flat rate conversion tax. See supra note 145.
235. Id. at 74.
236. Lapping, Differential Assessment and Other Techniques to Preserve Missouri's Farmlands,
42 MO. L. REV. 369, 384 (1977).
237. N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.8 (Supp. 1981).
238. Koch, Implementation and Early Effects of the New Jersey Farmland Assessment Act 10,
13, NEW BRUNSWICK: DEP'T OF AG. ECON. & MKTING, RUTGERS UNIV. (1968).
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While more recent surveys reveal that the rate of conversion has de-
clined considerably since passage of the act, they also show that deferred
taxation has actually encouraged land speculation. Average losses have
dropped from 40,000 acres per year in the 1954-64 pre-act period to
19,500 acres per year during the 1965-75 period, and finally to 2,500
acres per year in the 1975-79 period.239 On the other hand, since farmland
assessment is granted on the basis of the land's actual use rather than the
intent of its owner,24 speculators and developers have purchased land
and leased it back to farmers, thereby reducing their holding costs until
they are ready to develop.24'
It has been estimated that from 10242 to 53243 percent of the land in the
program is held for investment; rollback taxes will simply be added to
the sales price at the time of development.24 Studies of farmland sales
during 1978 and 1979 disclose that 25 percent of the acreage sold was
purchased for investment and 13 percent for development. 4 5 Similar data
for 1977 and 1978 show that 23 percent of farmland changing hands was
purchased for investment, 19 percent for development.
4 6
In short, deferred taxation has been ineffective as a farmland preser-
vation tool primarily because it provides little incentive for the farmer to
resist development pressure and leaves land use decision-making chiefly
in the hands of farmers and investors. No overall planning occurs and,
in its absence, society's interest in preserving agricultural land remains
subordinate to private economic interests.
Restrictive Agreements.
Unlike deferred taxation systems which fail for lack of overall planning,
California's Williamson Act247 is an integral part of the state's highly
structured planning system. In exchange for use value assessment, land-
owners are required to sign agreements restricting the rights to develop
their land, but only land within a designated agricultural preserve is
eligible for enrollment.2 48 Moreover, the establishment of preserves is
only one feature of a system which requires counties to develop general
land use plans which include provisions for the preservation of agricultural
239. Comment, The Future of Farmland And Preservation: Will New Jersey Remain The Garden
State?, 12 RUTGERS L. J. 713, 719-20 (1981).
240. N.J. Const. art. VIII, §1, para. 1; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-23.2 (West Supp. 1981).
241. Kolesar & Scholl, supra note 159, at 31.
242. Id.
243. Comment, supra note 239, at 722.
244. Kolesar & Scholl, supra note 159.
245. Comment, supra note 239, at 723.
246. Id.
247. CAL. GOV'T CODE, § 51200-51295 (West Supp. 1982). See supra, text accompanying
notes 188-201.
248. Supra note 189.
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land.249 It might be expected that such a plan would effectively protect
farmland, yet studies unanimously judge the system to be a failure pri-
marily because the tax savings resulting from use value assessment do
not offset the possible gains to be had by a farmer who keeps his options
open by declining to participate.5
A 1978 study of the success of the act in three counties in the San
Francisco Bay area revealed that, in Contra Costa county, agreements
restricted 88 million acres, but of 48 thousand acres of prime land in the
county, only nine thousand were enrolled. Instead, grazing land accounted
for most of the enrolled acreage. More than one-half the contracted land
was over three miles from an incorporated city, and in the most productive
areas of the county, where the difference between use value and fair
market value was greatest, very few contracts had been signed.51 In
Alameda County, where contracts protected two-thirds of the county's
agricultural land and open space land, the agreements covered less than
one-half of the prime land. Again, grazing land contracts predominated,
and most enrolled land was located in areas beyond the range of pre-
dictable growth."sa
It is apparent that the Williamson Act is failing not because farmers
in general are declining to participate, but rather because those who own
land most vulnerable to conversion are refusing to sign contracts. The
latter are simply unwilling to restrict their land, particularly in light of a
tax benefit amounting only to approximately five percent of fair market
value. 53
249. Id.
250. The studies conclude that farmers are simply not signing agreements on the most vulnerable
land but generally do not consider the county's responsibility for first establishing agricultural
preserves. It may well be that local governments are failing to designate these areas as appropriate
for restrictive agreements. While more information is needed, one commentator suggests that counties
are generally abdicating their planning responsibility to landowners who apply for the creation of
preserves.
Landowner initiation of the contract process (the second method) is the most
widely used procedure throughout the state. Though local governments have the
authority to take the initiative and assure that appropriate land is eligible to come
under contract, this authority has not been exercised by most counties. When land-
owners initiated the contract process, the resulting spatial pattern of land under use
restriction is likely to be a random one.
Gustafson & Wallace, Differential Assessment as Land Use Policy: The California Code, 41 J. AM
INST. PLANNERS 379, 385 (1975).
Other studies suggest that the result is no different when the county initiates the designation. Even
though all of Santa Clara County was declared to be a preserve no prime land was enrolled for three
years. See infra text accompanying note 261.
251. Comment, supra note 223, at 1875-1877.
252. Id. at 1877-81. On the location of land under contract, see also, Hansen & Schwartz,
Landowner Behavior at the Rural Urban Fringe in Response to Preferential Property Taxation, 51
LAND ECON. 340 (1975).
253. The present value of reduced property taxes on land under contract for ten years is approx-
imately five percent of the initial market value. Gustafson, supra note 250, at 384. See also, Hansen
& Schwartz, Landowner Benefitsfrom Use ValueAssessment Under the California Land Conservation
Act, 58 AM. J. AG. ECON. 170 (1976).
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Predictably, a survey conducted among farmers in Sacramento County
reflected no enrollment among those who expected development within
ten years. Only 19 percent of farmers expecting development within 10
to 20 years had enrolled; the percentage increased to only 30 among
farmers not expecting development for over 20 years .14 Similarly, in Yolo
County, farmers owning 46.3 percent of the land in the county would
not have accepted a 20 year contract, even though more than one-half
did not expect development for over 25 years.5 The pollsters concluded
that "[t]hese individuals did not appear willing to risk having a 'contract
restrict their ability to sell their land for development.' ,,16
The California experience clearly demonstrates that, even as the pri-
mary component of a highly structured planning system, use value as-
sessment is not an effective technique for the preservation of agricultural
land. 7 So long as the landowner remains totally free to sell his land to
the highest bidder, he is understandably unwilling to restrict that right,
especially in exchange for a minimal tax benefit.
In order to be effective, farmland preservation techniques must respond
to that fundamental economic reality; they must account for the farmer's
"values, goals and assumptions."" Use control programs which place
limitations on land development, thereby partially constraining private
economic forces, provide one possible response. Programs which afford
benefits, economic or otherwise, substantial enough to offset the farmer's
urge to maximize profits by selling land for development, provide another.
At a minimum, use control programs create a temporary moratorium,
at least delaying conversion while providing time for more extensive
study. Nonetheless, such programs (e.g. zoning) tend to be unpopular
with farmers s9 and are often implemented primarily to accomplish urban
planning goals." Thus, while an ideal program of broad-based planning
for farmland should probably incorporate both use controls and benefits,
I submit that no program can begin to "exercise rational control" over
the private land development cycle without to some extent implementing
at least one of the approaches.
The striking difference in result which can occur when one of the above
alternatives is put into practice is apparent when events in Santa Clara
County, one of California's most urbanized counties, are compared with
those in the state as a whole. While much of that county's prime land
254. Hansen, supra note 252, at 348.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. See also, Hansen, supra note 252; Final Report supra note 4, at 69; UNTAXING OPEN
SPACE, supra note 106, at 66-79.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 75, 88, 89.
259. Id.
260. See infra text accompanying notes 260-68.
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has already been developed, more than one-half the county remains in
agricultural use. In 1967, the entire county was designated an agricultural
preserve, enabling owners to sign contracts, yet no prime land was en-
rolled prior to 1970. It was only with the 1973 enactment of the county's
Urban Development Plan that significant acreage was enrolled.26'
That plan establishes "urban services areas" of sufficient size to ac-
commodate predicted growth around each of the 15 incorporated com-
munities in the county. One who wishes to develop land beyond such a
boundary must apply to the nearest city for annexation. If the application
is granted, the plan suggests that infrastructure costs be borne by the new
residents. If the request for annexation is denied, development may not
occur. 
262
The plan has channeled development away from rural areas and caused
developers to "fill-in" leapfrogged land within the urban service areas.263
As previously noted, it has additionally been a catalyst for enrollment
under the Williamson Act. By 1978, nearly 47 percent of the county's
agricultural land, of which six percent was prime, had been protected by
contracts. 264
It appears that as long as farmers had some hope that they could sell
their property in the near future at development prices, they were
not interested in restricting the property's use and value by enrolling
in the Williamson Act program. The Urban Development Plan changed
the landowner's expectations as to the prospects for development of
his land. The plan provided owners of agricultural and other open-
space lands on the county's rural-urban fringe with an objective
means of evaluating and predicting the development potential of their
property.
21
In establishing its urban development plan, Santa Clara County rec-
ognized that in developing areas, farmland preservation and orderly urban
growth are facets of the same problem, "that any long-term plan for open-
space preservation must of necessity include a plan for urban develop-
ment. 2 66 By "exercising rational control"267 over urban growth, Santa
Clara County has been able to constrain economic forces and to remove
at least the broad outline of land use decision-making from the private
to the public sector.
To be sure, the Santa Clara program is directed more at urban growth
control than at farmland preservation. "Standing alone, the concept of
261. Comment, supra note 223, at 1884-85.
262. Id. at 1882-83.
263. Id. at 1883.
264. Id. at 1885.
265. Id. at 1885-86.
266. Comment, supra note 223, at 1884.
267. See supra text accompanying note 75.
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staged growth relied upon in the Urban Development Plan merely serves
to postpone urbanization and exerts but an indirect and temporary impact
on the preservation of California's agricultural lands." '268 Nevertheless,
compared to the general failure of the Williamson Act, the plan is a step
in the right direction, providing at least time to consider alternative so-
lutions. 69
Mandatory Zoning and Planning
The success of the Santa Clara system appears to be due to the adoption
of a use control scheme aimed solely at urban growth management. By
contrast, the Wisconsin Farmland Preservation Act,27° which links tax
benefits to zoning and planning, constitutes a broad-based system of
planning for the preservation of agricultural land.
By December, 1981, as phase I of the program wound toward a close,
initial agreements covering 546,000 acres had been signed or were being
processed, thereby providing tax credits to 2100 farms.27' At the same
time, in preparation for phase II, in which credits depend on the degree
of zoning and planning, all or part of 20 counties had been zoned exclu-
sively for agriculture.72 Owners of approximately 2.66 million acres, or
about 18.1 percent273 of the state's farmland, are thus automatically eli-
gible for tax credits. By July, 1982, the preservation plans of 65 counties,
containing well over ninety percent of the state's farmland, 274 either had
been or were soon to be certified.275 Wisconsin officials believe the over-
whelming response is the product of the agricultural community's gen-
eralized support for preservation as well as its desire for tax credits, 76
which averaged over $1,600 in 1981.277
While it is not yet possible to make a complete assessment of the
Wisconsin program, data from two counties which have used agricultural
268. Comment, supra note 223, at 1886.
269. Id. at 1887-91.
270. See supra text accompanying notes 204-21.
271. Trade and Consumer Protection Div. Wisconsin Dep't. of Ag., Technical Report #9, Par-
ticipation in the Wisconsin Farmland Preservation Program (1981).
272. Id.
273. Id. The percentage is derived from an earlier report which revealed that 2.51 million acres
or 13.8% of the State's total had been zoned exclusively for agriculture. Trade and Consumer
Protection Div., Wisconsin Dep't. of Ag., Report And Recommendations on the Effects of the
Wisconsin Farmland Preservation Law 5 (1981)(hereinafter Report on Wisconsin Farmland).
274. Id. at 6. The Report states that the counties then having or developing plans contained about
92% of the State's farmland.
275. Conversation with James Johnson of the Trade and Consumer Protection Div. Wisconsin
Dep't. of Ag., July 8, 1982.
276. Report on Wisconsin Farmland, supra note 273, at 8-9. Opponents of the program often
express a distrust of government programs in general as well as a particularized fear that the system
is the first step toward state imposed land use controls. Id. at 5, 8, 9.
. 277. Technical Report #9, supra note 271.
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zoning for at least five years suggest that it will be effective in non-
metropolitan areas. Compared to similar counties without zoning, both
of the counties experienced less conversion to nonfarm uses.78 Perhaps
more importantly, development that did take place tended to occur on
poorer quality soil, and in one county took a more compact form than in
the control counties.279 Success is also predictable in urban counties where
preliminary reports indicate that the program is preserving farmland, as
well as facilitating growth management, in high development areas sur-
rounding Madison and Milwaukee.2"'
It thus appears that the Wisconsin Farmland Preservation Act will
succeed where California's Williamson Act has failed. The difference is
due primarily to the fact that Wisconsin, unlike California, places con-
straints on private economic forces.
Wisconsin farmers are no different from California farmers; it is in
their economic best interest to keep their options open. Not surprisingly,
a survey profiling signers and nonsigners of phase I initial agreements
revealed that a larger percentage of signers were more "future oriented,"
e.g., intending to make major investments, or expecting their children
eventually to take over their operations. Conversely, a larger percentage
of nonsigners expected to retire within ten years. Significantly, nonsigners
were almost twice as likely (15 percent versus 8 percent) to believe they
could sell their land for development within the next ten years.28'
The Wisconsin Farmland Preservation Act responds to that basic eco-
nomic reality by strongly encouraging local governments to enact land
use controls. Counties and towns have been induced to implement zoning
and planning by the desire of local landowners to obtain the substantial
tax benefits which accompany such programs.28 2 Farmers' traditional op-
position to zoning... has been overcome by the promise of tax credits
which, because they are based on farmers' net incomes rather than only
on their property tax bills,284 are roughly three times greater than ad
valorem tax relief which would accrue under use value assessment.8 5
Moreover, those credits primarily benefit those most needing financial
relief in order to continue farming. The maximum possible credit is
278. Report on Wisconsin Farmland, supra note 273, at 12, 14-15. In Columbia County a
followup of those denied rezonings revealed that in all cases the individuals bought or built in an
incorporated area or bought or refurbished an existing rural home. "Clearly the zoning did save
farmland in these cases." Id. at 12.
279. Id. at 12, 14-15.
280. Supra note 275.
281. Report on Wisconsin Farmland, supra note 273, at 11.
282. See supra, text accompanying notes 211-17.
283. See supra, text accompanying notes 75-89 and note 434 infra.
284. See supra, text accompanying note 177.
285. Report on Wisconsin Farmland, supra 273, at 18.
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$4,200, which is available to a farmer with a net household income of
zero to $5,000 and a property tax bill of $6,000 or more.286
It follows that the increased profits generated by the tax credits will
serve to offset the farmer's urge to succumb to development pressure. In
that way the Wisconsin Farmland Preservation Act "exercises rational
control ' 287 over the private land development cycle. It will be successful
because it incorporates land use controls and benefits addressed to the
"values, goals and assumptions ' 281 of the farmer into a system of broad-
based planning for the preservation of agricultural land.
AGRICULTURAL DISTRICTING
The agricultural districting legislation enacted by six states289 seeks to
implement an incentive approach to farmland preservation. Instead of
utilizing use controls, such programs provide benefits which encourage
the farmer to resist development pressure. Although the scope varies from
a modest plan in Illinois to one integrated with a comprehensive planning
and control system in Minnesota,2" the acts possess a common format:
in exchange for enrolling land 'in a district, farmers receive protection
from intrusive governmental action, such as a regulation prohibiting road-
side fruit stands.291 The New York Agricultural Districting Law, enacted
in 1971, is the most firmly established program and will serve as the
principal discussion model.
The New York Agricultural Districting Law
Under the New York system, the owner or owners292 of at least 500
acres may petition the county legislative body for the creation of an
286. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 214. At the opposite end of the spectrum, a farmer with an
income of $40,000 or more receives no credit, regardless of the amount of property tax he pays.
Id. at 215. In 1978, credits averaged $1,193 per household. Households with incomes less than
$5,000 received the equivalent of a 63% reduction in property taxes. Households with $25,000-
$30,000 and $30,000-$35,000 received respectively the equivalents of only 26% and 4% reductions.
Thus, "[i]n general, tax credits went to households with moderate or low incomes, and the percent
reduction in net taxes declined as income increased." Report on Wisconsin Farmland, supra note
273, at 16.
287. See supra text accompanying notes 75, 87-89.
288. Id.
289. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51230-51239 (West Supp. 1982), the portions of the Williamson
Act that provide for the creation of agricultural preserves; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, § 1001-1020
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-82); MD. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 2-501 to 2-515 (Supp. 1981); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §473 H.01-.17 (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 300-309 (McKinney
Supp. 1981); VA. CODE § 15.1-1506 to 1513 (Supp. 1981).
290. See infra text accompanying notes 339-62.
291. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 80.
292. Land may be included in a proposed district without the owner's consent, although he may
request exclusion before designation is final, provided he owns at least ten percent of the proposed
district. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 303 (McKinney Supp. 1981). Exclusion is not automatic,
however. In Monroe County, only about 60% of land in districts is owned by original petitioners.
Guidebook, supra note 126, at 84.
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agricultural district.293 While not all land within a district is required to
be engaged in active farming, the area restriction insures that districts
are agriculturally viable even if they are surrounded by nonagricultural
development.294
Prior to holding a public hearing to consider the petition, the legislature
is required to seek the advice of both the county planning board and the
agricultural districting committee,295 the latter consisting of four active
farmers, four agribusinessmen, and a chairperson who is a member of
the county legislature.296 Factors the legislature must consider in deciding
whether to grant the petition include the viability of active farming in the
proposed district and adjacent areas, the presence of viable farmland
within the proposed district which is not then in agricultural use, the
nature and extent of nonfarm uses within the proposed district, and the
county's development patterns and needs.297 Following adoption at the
county level, a petition must also be approved at the state level where it
will be examined for consistency with state environmental policies and
comprehensive plans.29 Districts are reviewed every eight years from the
date of creation, but a decision to terminate or modify rests solely with
the county, not the landowner.2' Again, any such action is subject to
review for consistency with state policy.3"°
While district land is eligible for use value assessment, subject to a
five year rollback tax if it is converted to nonfarm use,30' the essence of
agricultural district legislation lies in its other profarm benefits. First,
paralleling the language of the federal Farmland Protection Policy Act,3 2
the New York act directs all state agencies to develop or modify policies
so as to "encourage the maintenance of viable farming" within districts.30 3
In keeping with that general policy, the legislation makes it clear that
farming will take precedence over the concerns of nonfarm residents.
293. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 303.1 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
294. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 83.
295. N.Y. AGRIC & MKTS. LAW § 303.2.
296. Id. §302.1.
297. Id. §303.3.
298. Id. § 303.5. The state commissioner of agriculture and markets may also create districts of
no less than 2000 acres of "unique and irreplaceable" agricultural land. Such a district must also
be consistent with state environmental policies and comprehensive plans. Id. § 304. As of May,
1980, no such districts had been formed. Conklin & Gardner, AGRICULTURAL DISTRICT LEG-
ISLATION IN NEW YORK, (Ithaca: Dep't of Agric. Econ., Cornell Univ. 1980).
299. Bryant, FARMLAND PRESERVATION ALTERNATIVES IN SEMI-SUBURBAN AREAS
13 (Ithaca: Dep't of Agric. Econ., Cornell Univ. 1975).
300. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 303.8 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
301. Id. § 304-a, 305.1. Individual farmers, not within a district, are also eligible for differential
assessment upon the execution of an eight year restrictive covenant which must be renewed annually.
Breach of the covenant triggers a substantial penalty. Id. § 306.
302. See supra, text accompanying note 68.
303. Id. § 305.3.
304. See generally, supra text accompanying notes 123-26.
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Local governments are prohibited from enacting laws or ordinances which
would "unreasonably restrict or regulate farm structures or farming prac-
tices ...unless such restrictions ...bear a direct relationship to the
public health or safety."3' 5 Thus, a local governing body cannot, in re-
sponse to complaints about farm noise, enact an ordinance limiting the
hours during which a farmer can operate his machinery. 0 6
More fundamentally, the act seeks, in three ways, to restrict the de-
velopment which eventually leads to those tensions.
First, severe limitations are imposed on the power of local govern-
mental units to make special assessments against district lands. Except
for a one-half acre lot surrounding a dwelling or nonfarming structure,
no benefit assessments or special ad valorem levies for sewer, water,
lighting, non-farm drainage, solid waste disposal or other landfill oper-
ations are to be imposed on farmland within a district.30 7
Second, any governmental agency or public benefit corporation which
proposes to advance money, for instance through a grant or loan, for
nonfarm construction within a district must file a notice of intent with
state agricultural authorities. The report must include a justification of
the project as well as an "evaluation of alternatives" which do not involve
the use of district land. If, after consultation with environmental experts,
agriculture officials conclude the project will have an "unreasonably ad-
verse effect" upon the act's goals, a 60 day delay will be ordered. In
such a case, a public hearing must precede the issuance of a final report.30 8
The act does not, however, provide a means to halt such a project.
Finally, the act substantially restricts the use of the eminent domain
power within the district. Proposed condemnations of more than ten acres
from any one district farm or a total of more than one hundred acres from
any district are subject to the same rules which govern public loans and
grants.3 '
The Act's Effectiveness
As will be discussed later, the New York system possesses the same
fundamental flaw as California's Williamson Act, namely its inability to
protect the most vulnerable lands.3"' Nevertheless, as of May, 1982, 449
305. N.Y. AGRIC & MKTS. LAW § 305.2 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
306. One New York farmer supported formation of a district so as to exclude himself from such
an ordinance. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 80.
307. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 305.5 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
308. Id. § 305.4
309. Id.
310. See infra, text accompanying notes 329-33.
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districts, containing 7,115,830 acres,3 ' or 71 percent of the state's farm-
land,' had been established. In 30 counties," 3 including the two sur-
rounding Buffalo314 and one in the New York City area,315 over 100,000
acres had been enrolled. A 1977 survey of farmers in 17 counties revealed
that a desire to reduce taxes was the most significant reason for enrolling
(33.3 percent) but that preventing conversion of the land to nonfarm uses
was only slightly less important (30.8 percent).31 6 Complete statistics are
unavailable, but apparently relatively little acreage has been withdrawn
from districts for conversion to nonfarm use.317
In addition to providing profarm benefits to most of the state's farmers,
the plan has fostered a more reasoned land use decision-making process.
By coordinating decisions concerning agricultural land with broader en-
vironmental policy, New York has made a major policy statement, namely
that protecting farmland is important not only in and of itself but also as
part of a broad policy of wise land use. As the act's preamble declares,
its purpose is "to provide a means by which agricultural land may be
protected and enhanced as a viable segment of the state's economy and
as an economic and environmental resource of major importance. "318
The very existence of that policy doubtless serves as an incentive to
New York farmers; over 35 percent of those responding to the 1977 survey
indicated that being in a district helped farmers to decide to stay in farming
by providing "an atmosphere of confidence. "319 Moreover, the act forces
the recognition of land use conflicts. Consequently, in several instances
the review process had made it readily apparent that an inappropriate land
use decision had been made or that more study was needed. For example,
even though the New York act does not provide for the cancellation of
311. Department of Agric. & Mkts., State of New York, SUMMARY OF AGRICULTURAL
DISTRICT STATUS (May 15, 1982)(unpublished).
312. The percentage is derived using the Guidebook's statement that the nearly 6 million acres
then in districts amounted to 60.0% of the State's farmland.
313. Summary, supra note 311.
314. In Erie County, 238,169 acres are in districts; Niagara County contains 139,875 districted
acres. Id.
315. In Orange County, 157,967 acres are in district. Id.
316. White & Gardner, NEW YORK'S AGRICULTURAL DISTRICTS PROGRAM: AN ANAL-
YSIS OF FARMERS PERCEPTIONS IN 17 COUNTIES 17. (Ithaca: Dep't of Agric. Econ., Cornell
Univ. 1978). Over forty-two percent of those responding felt the program's strongest feature was
its protection of farmland for farm use. Id. at 23.
317. Telephone conversation with Henry H. Stebbins, New York Dep't of Agric. & Mkts., July
8, 1982.
In Erie County from 1972-77, 247 acres of district land, contrasted to 773 acres of nondistrict
land, were converted to nonfarm use. Most of the converted district land, 210 acres, shifted to
residential use, while most of the nondistrict land, 734 acres, shifted to urban and residential strip
development. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 92.
318. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 300 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
319.White & Gardner, supra note 316, at 21. See also supra, Guidebook, note 126, at 93.
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proposed condemnations which have an "unnecessary adverse effect"
upon its goals,32 a hearing on the appropriateness of a power facility
proposed for district land near Albany provided the impetus for further
study.32
1
Similarly, the provision permitting local governments to enact regu-
lations "bearing a direct relationship to the public health or safety ' 322 is
seemingly as broad as the police power itself 223 The potential effective-
ness of the provision restricting the use of police powers 324 is therefore
limited, since an ordinance banning aerial crop dusting would arguably
bear directly on the public's health. Nonetheless, the act forces local
officials to evaluate the effects of proposed legislation on agriculture. In
short, by simply requiring local governing bodies to think about the effects
of their actions, the legislation has had, and should continue to have,
some success in directing growth away from agricultural areas. 3"
Notwithstanding those successes, the system suffers from its case by
case approach. Although county governing bodies receive the advice of
both farmers and planners in initially deciding whether a district should
be formed,326 petitions are nonetheless handled on an individual basis.
Thus, even though the legislature must consider the effects of other actions
upon agriculture,327 the system does not provide for an overall plan which
would conserve agricultural land while directing growth to appropriate
areas. 
328
More critically, however, the system suffers from the same inadequacy
as the various use value assessment programs: on vulnerable urban-fringe
lands, the benefits may not outweigh the advantage of owning unrestricted
land when the irresistible offer comes along.
Despite the fact that district land could be converted to nonfarm use
without a waiting period, upon the payment of a five year rollback tax,329
the program's other restrictions would remain in effect. Thus, limitations
320. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 305.4 (McKinney Supp. 1981). Contrast the Minnesota
eminent domain provision, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 357-62. Similarly, in Cali-
fornia, condemnation of preserve land may not occur simply because agricultural land is less ex-
pensive to acquire, nor may it occur if location of the project on other land is reasonably feasible.
Cal. Gov't Code §51291 (West Supp. 1982). However the board administering the preserve can
defeat those protective features by agreeing to the condemnation. Id. § 51293.
321. See supra, note 317.
322. See supra, text accompanying note 305. Myers, The LegalAspects ofAgriculturalDistricting,
55 INDIANA L.J. 1, 35 (1979).
323. See supra, text accompanying note 305.
324. Id.
325. Myers, supra note 322, at 29.
326. See supra, text accompanying notes 296-97.
327. See supra, text accompanying notes 305-07, 309.
328. County planning is optional in New York. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 239-b (McKinney
1976).
329. See supra, text accompanying note 302.
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on the extension of government services... would force infrastructure costs
upon the developer. Hence, even if a sale were negotiated, the buyer
would be willing to pay considerably less than for unrestricted land.33" '
In short, "the district concept does not provide the owners of farmland
in semi-suburban areas, whose opportunity for capital gains is high, with
adequate compensation or incentives to cover the loss in control and any
losses in land value that result from placing land in a district."332
It is thus not surprising that the recent NALS survey reveals that in
1977, only 23.7 percent of New York land within 25 miles of urban
centers with populations of 50,000 or more was within a district and that
only 3.6 percent of the land within ten miles was enrolled. Likewise,
although 95.1 percent of land within 25 miles of urban centers with
populations of 2,500 or more was in districts, over 65 percent of all
enrolled land was located beyond the ten mile mark.333
New York officials are not unaware of the act's shortcomings. One
officer of the State Department of Agriculture and Marketing has com-
mented, "we're not stopping a farmer from selling to a developer. But
we are making farming more viable and are encouraging farmers to
invest."334 As the remark suggests, the New York agricultural districting
law encourages continued farming because it identifies and responds to
the "values, goals and assumptions" '335 of the agricultural community.
The incentives which it provides, in combination with the fact that the
act is the catalyst for both evaluating the effects of local policy upon
agriculture and approaching agricultural issues in a broader environmental
context, account for the fact that 71 percent of the state's farmland has
been enrolled in districts.336
Incentives alone will not, however, protect the most vulnerable land.
Consequently, the act's effectiveness is inhibited by the absence of long-
range planning and use control. The inadequacy is likely to be most
apparent at the urban fringe where farmers maintain control over devel-
opment patterns by retaining the freedom not to form a district. Thus, it
is the same voluntariness of the system which accounts for its popularity
with farmers337 that may also be its greatest deficiency and account for
it not being as successful as it might be.
It was suggested earlier in this article that the most effective farmland
preservation programs would be those in which incentives directed toward
330. See supra, text accompanying note 307.
331. Bryant, supra note 299.
332. Id.
333. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 88.
334. Id. at 92.
335. See supra, text accompanying notes 75-89.
336. Supra note 312.
337. Supra note 322.
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agriculture operated in conjunction with land use controls. 3 8 Therefore,
a program which combined the successful aspects of the New York act
with a system of development control would encourage continued farming
as well as protect vulnerable urban fringe land by directing growth away
from agricultural areas. The program adopted in the Minneapolis-St. Paul
metropolitan area, discussed below, attempts to accomplish those dual
goals.
The Minnesota Program
In contrast to the New York Agricultural Districting Act which requires
neither overall planning nor use control, the Metropolitan Agricultural
Preserves Act,339 governing seven counties in the Twin Cities area,"4
limits agricultural preserves, or districts, to only those areas which have
been designated agricultural by a local or county comprehensive plan and
which have been zoned accordingly.3 4' The act is part of a much larger
comprehensive land use planning program.342
Subject to some minor exceptions, farming units of at least 40 acres 343
must first be set aside and zoned so as to permit no more than one
residential unit per 40 acres.'" A preserve may then be created in exchange
for the owner's execution of a covenant restricting the land to agricultural
use. 345 Such covenants run with the land3 46 and while landowners may
terminate agreements without governmental consent, they will not expire
until eight years after notice of intent to terminate has been filed.347
As is true under the New York program, Minnesota state agencies are
instructed to encourage the maintenance of viable farming within the
preserve.348 Specifically, regulations which "favor nonagricultural de-
velopment and adversely affect the long term nature of farming in an
agricultural preserve" are to be modified.349 Land enrolled in the Min-
nesota program receives the benefit of use value assessment;350 it is also
338. See supra, text accompanying note 257.
339. MINN. STAT. ANN. §473 H.01-.17 (West Supp. 1982).
340. Id. §473 H.02(8); § 473.121(2).
341. Id. §473 H.02(7); §473 H.04.
342. Id. §473.851-872 (West Supp. 1982).
343. Id. §473 H.03.
344. Id. §473 H.07.
345. Id. §473 H.05.
346. Id.
347. Id. § 473 H.08 subd. 2. A governing authority may terminate an agreement by serving notice
upon the landowner after first amending the comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance so that the
land is no longer planned for agriculture. As with landowner initiated terminations, expiration does
not actually occur for eight years. Id. subd. 3.
Early termination can occur only in the event of a public emergency and pursuant to an executive
order by the governor. Id. § 473 H.09.
348. Id. §473 H.13.
349. Id.
350. Id. §473 H.10.
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protected from municipal annexation35' and from regulations or ordinances
which would unreasonably restrict rural farm structures or practices. 35 2
The Minnesota act restricts the extension of infrastructure into agri-
cultural preserves more severely than does the New York act.353 Con-
struction of public sewer or water systems on preserve land is prohibited. 3- 4
New connections between lands or buildings in agricultural preserves and
public,sewer or water systems are likewise prohibited. 355 Moreover, pre-
serve lands are not subject to special benefit assessment for any such
projects built in the vicinity since they are "deemed of no benefit to the
land and buildings in agricultural preserves. 356
In addition, any governmental agency which proposes to advance funds
for the construction of dwellings, commercial or industrial facilities, or
water or sewer facilities which would be used to serve nonfarm structures
within a preserve must file notice of intent with the state environmental
quality board. 357 The agency making the proposal is required to justify it
and to provide an "evaluation of alternatives which would not require
acquisition within agricultural preserves. ' 35' The environmental quality
board, which examines the proposal's impact upon agriculture and its
relationship to local and regional comprehensive plans, is empowered to
issue a 60 day cease and desist order if it finds the project might have
an "unreasonable effect" on a preserve. 35 In such a case, a public hearing
must precede a final decision. 3 °
The same provisions apply to eminent domain proceedings involving
over ten acres of preserve land.3 6' However, unlike the New York act
which does not provide a means to halt such projects, the Minnesota
environmental, act empowers the board to suspend eminent domain actions
for up to one year when it determines that there are "feasible and prudent
alternatives which have less negative impact" on agricultural preserves.362
While it is too early to judge completely the effectiveness of the Min-
nesota program, initial response has been positive and enrollment more
rapid than expected.363 Of the 1.91 million acres in the seven metropolitan
counties 1.041 million acres, approximately 55 percent, are considered
farmland. As of August, 1982, 46 percent of that farmland, 484,000
351. Id. §473 H.14.
352. Id. §473 H.12.
353. See supra, text accompanying note 307.
354. Id. §473 H.11.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. §473 H.15 subd. 1, 2.
358. Id. §473 H.15 subd. 2.
359. Id. §473 H.15 subd. 4.
360. Id. §473 H.15 subd. 5.
361. Id. §473 H.15 subd. 1.
362. Id. §437 H.15 subd. 9.
363. Telephone conversation with James Schoettler, Metropolitan Council, August 3, 1982.
January 1984]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
acres, had been certified as potential preserve land.364 Although no con-
centrated preserve area yet existed, some 13 percent of the certified land,
62,000 acres, had been set aside into 500-600 separate preserves.3 65
Eventually, I believe, we can expect substantially greater participation
in the Minnesota program than may be occurring at the urban fringe under
the New York act.366 Since the land is already zoned for agriculture, a
landowner who does not participate foregoes the act's benefits, including
tax relief, on the gamble that he may obtain a variance when needed for
his property. Variances may not be readily available because, under the
Minnesota zoning statute, applicants for a variance which may have a
"material adverse effect" upon the environment may be required to "dem-
onstrate the nature and extent of the effect." 367 Consequently, the farmer
has little to gain from withholding his land from the program.
By utilizing comprehensive planning and land use control, the Met-
ropolitan Agricultural Preserves Act has, or should, accomplish what the
New York Agricultural Districting Act has been unable to accomplish-
the preservation of urban fringe farmland. The act combines those ele-
ments with profarm benefits which offset the farmer's urge to succumb
to development pressure. Thus, like the Wisconsin Farmland Preservation
Act,"' it encourages continued use of the land for farming. Under the
Minnesota plan, the farmer's "values, goals, and assumptions ' 369 and
the public interest in farmland preservation are "mutually supportive. 370
That relationship is demonstrated by the fact that it was the existence
of the agricultural preserves act which led a number of local governing
bodies to adopt agricultural zoning.37' Zoning has traditionally been un-
popular with farmers, 372 but in this instance they were apparently willing
to exchange diminished control over their land for the act's profarm
provisions. An official of the metropolitan council summed up the situ-
ation by stating that "without knowledge of the incentives, agricultural
zoning would not have occurred." 373
In summary, the results of the Minnesota plan have already shown,
and should continue to show, that the most effective preservation of
agricultural land occurs when farming incentives are an integral part of
a system of broad-based planning.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. See supra, text accompanying note 329.
367. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 394.362 (19).
368. See supra, text accompanying notes 205-21, 281-88.
369. See supra, text accompanying notes 75, 88-89.
370. Supra note 363.
371. Id.
372. See supra, text accompanying notes 75-89 and note 434, infra.
373. Supra note 363.
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AGRICULTURAL ZONING
Unlike prototype differential assessment and agricultural districting
programs, which leave the farmer in control of his land but offer him
incentives to resist development pressure, the techniques discussed in the
remaining three sections divest the farmer of varying degrees of control,
either by regulating development or actually severing the right to develop
from his property. This section will discuss agricultural zoning, and the
next two sections will respectively discuss purchase of development rights
and transfer of development rights.
Zoning has been used extensively as an urban land use control device
since its approval by the United States Supreme Court in Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co.374 More recently, as land use problems have emerged
in rural areas, officials naturally turned to zoning as the means to regulate
growth. Early large-lot zoning programs were upheld on a variety of
grounds, including the desire to preserve open space and/or peace and
quiet, and the need to avoid strain on sewer and water systems.375 More
recently, however, such ordinances have been invalidated as "exclusion-
ary" means of restricting growth.376
Notwithstanding the fact that agricultural zoning utilizes minimum
areas much larger than large-lot zoning, it has become a common method
for the preservation of farmland. Nationwide, at least 270 counties and
municipalities have adopted agricultural zoning ordinances.37 7 These or-
dinances have generally been upheld,378 although the challenges have
been made primarily by those who alleged the regulation constituted a
taking. However, in a case brought to enforce the landmark exclusionary
zoning decision in Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mt. Laurel,3 79 a New Jersey court seemed to imply that such programs
374. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
375. See generally, 2 WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW, ch. 30 (1974).
376. E.g., Kavenewsky v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Warren, 160 Conn. 397, 279 A.2d
567 (1971); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); National Land
and Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Contra, Steel Hill Development,
Inc. v. Town of Sanborton, 469 F.2d 956 (Ist Cir. 1972).
377. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 104.
As part of an all encompassing land planning program, Oregon requires local agricultural zoning.
OR. REV. STAT. § 215.03 et seq. See generally, S. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING
LAW, § 160.15a-6 (Supp. 1981). In Hawaii zoning is adopted by a state level commission. HAW.
REV. STAT., ch. 205. See generally, BOSSELMAN & CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION
IN LAND USE CONTROL, 5-53 (1971)(prepared for CEQ).
378. E.g., Helix Land Co., Inc. v. City of San Diego, 82 Cal. App. 3d 932, 147 Cal. Rptr. 683
(1978); Sierra Terreno v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 79 Cal. App. 3d 439, 144 Cal. Rptr.
776 (1978); Gisler v. County of Modena, 38 Cal. App. 3d 303, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1974); Joyce
v. City of Portland, 24 Or. App. 689, 546 P.2d 1100 (1976); Contra, Smeja v. County of Boone,
34 Ill. App. 3d 628, 339 N.E.2d 452 (1975).
379. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
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do not constitute exclusionary zoning. The court noted that the local
policy of preserving agricultural land conformed to statewide policy.3"'
Surprisingly little has been written on the subject of agricultural zoning.
The NALS Guidebook38" ' will thus serve as the primary source for ths
discussion. As that study points out, agricultural zoning ordinances are
divided into two basic types. Nonexclusive measures permit nonagricul-
tural development subject to restrictions which vary from program to
program; exclusive agricultural zoning bars most nonagricultural uses.3"2
Most ordinances deal only with residential development, and both types
permit nonfarm uses that either do not interfere with agriculture (e.g.
cemeteries) or serve farm communities (e.g. schools, churches). 38 3
Nonexclusive Agricultural Zoning
Nonexclusive ordinances are the most numerous3. 4 and are of four basic
types:
1) large minimum lot size;
2) fixed area combined with a small building lot size;
3) sliding scale area combined with a small building lot size; and
4) conditional use approval.385
Large lot ordinances, the most popular nonexclusive type,386 permit
nonfarm development as a matter of right on minimum lot sizes ranging
from ten to 640 acres. The area requirement usually corresponds to the
typical size of farms in the area.387
Under a fixed area-based system, landowners are entitled to develop
one lot for each land unit of a specified area.3 88 Thus, under what have
been called "quarter/quarter" zoning ordinances, a landowner can de-
velop one lot per quarter of a quarter section;389 a 40 acre tract yields one
lot, a quarter section, four lots. In contrast to large lot zoning, under
which the entire 40 acres constitutes the lot, area based systems super-
impose a small lot requirement upon the already divided property. Thus,
under the "quarter/quarter system," if the lot size were one acre, an
owner of 160 acres could develop only four total acres. Unlike large lot
zoning, which has a tendency to chop up farmland into parcels of the
380. Southern Burlington Co. NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 161 N.J. Super., 317, 338,
391 A.2d 935, 946 (1978).
381. Supra note 126.
382. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 110.
383. Id.
384. Id. at 111, 122.
385. Id. at 110.
386. Id. at 112.
387. Id.
388. Toner, Zoning to Protect Farming: A Citizen's Guidebook 26. NALS (1981).
389. Id.
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minimum permissible size, area-based systems encourage the clustering
of development on small sites, thereby preserving large contiguous tracts
of farmland." ° Some of these ordinances further protect the best agri-
cultural land by requiring development to take place on the least pro-
ductive soil.39'
By reducing the number of lots which may be developed as the size
of the tract increases, sliding scale area-based systems achieve results
similar to those achieved by fixed area zoning. For example, in Shrews-
bury Township, York County, Pennsylvania, a less than five acre tract
yields one developable lot, a five to 15 acre tract yields two lots, but a
30 to 60 acre tract permits development of only four lots.392 Such systems
also establish small lot sizes and often require construction to be on the
least productive soil.393
Finally, in contrast to the other nonexclusive categories which permit
limited development as a matter of right, conditional zoning systems
permit only those nonfarm uses satisfying designated criteria. For ex-
ample, the Deschutes County, Oregon ordinance provides that the con-
struction of a dwelling will be approved only when it is 1) compatible
with farm uses, the intent of the Exclusive Farm Use Zone established
under Oregon law, and the comprehensive plan; 2) does not seriously
interfere with accepted farm practices on adjacent lands; 3) will not
materially alter the stability of the overall land use pattern in the area;
and 4) is situated on land generally unsuitable for crop production or the
raising of livestock.394 Obviously, under such a system, a separate eli-
gibility determination must be made in each case.
Exclusive Agricultural Zoning
Although clearly possessing the potential for effective farmland pres-
ervation, exclusive agriculture zoning, which strictly prohibits nonfarm
development, is unpopular with farmers. Consequently, very few of these
ordinances have been enacted; of the 94 communities surveyed by NALS,
only seven had adopted exclusive agricultural zoning.395 Where such
systems exist, the construction of a nonfarm dwelling requires a change
in zoning.396
390. Id.
391. E.g., the Rice County Minnesota ordinance prohibits nonfarn dwellings on land which has
been tilled in the last five years and has Class I, II, or III soil. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 116.
Soil classifications are established by the Soil Conservation Service, USDA.
392. Id. at 119.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 120. The ordinance also spells out additional considerations to be used in evaluating
proposed nonfarm structures. Id. at 121.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 122.
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Effectiveness of Agricultural Zoning
As previously noted, the effectiveness of agricultural zoning has not
been extensively evaluated. The recent ten case study conducted by NALS39
will thus serve as an overview. Zoning ordinances in the ten communities398
cover 4,997,766 acres, ranging from 21 to 90 percent of the jurisdictions
involved.399 Seven of the ten ordinances require large lots, ranging from
a low of five acres to a high of 160 acres.4" One ordinance, of the fixed
area variety, permits the development of one acre for every 25 owned.401
The remaining two programs treat nonfarm development as a conditional
use.
40
2
In evaluating those programs, NALS focused primarily upon what is
perhaps the most crucial measure of zoning's effectiveness-its ability
to withstand pressure for rezoning. 0 3 Despite urban zoning's history of
vulnerability to political and economic pressure, 4 4 the NALS study con-
cludes that officials generally have made rural rezoning decisions on the
basis of the comprehensive plan and/or planning criteria which were
anchored in the purpose of the district.' 5 Generally, those criteria include
the farmability of the parcel, its proximity to farm population, the com-
patibility of surrounding uses, the availability of infrastructure, and the
environmental impact of the project.4°
The record of Black Hawk County, Iowa, which surrounds Waterloo,
is illustrative. The county's agricultural zoning is based on Corn Suita-
bility Ratings (CSR) which measure soil productivity. Based on analyses
of weather conditions, yield potential, history of erosion, and physical
and chemical properties, soils of the poorest quality rate five; the best
397. Id.
398. Weld, Tulane, Stanislaus Cos., Calif.; Dekalb Co., Ill.; Walworth Co., Wis.; Marion Co.,
Oreg.; Black Hawk Co., Iowa; West Hempfield, Lancaster Co., Pa.; Brooklyn Park, Hennepin Co.,
Minn.; Sioux Falls, Minnehaha Co., S.D. Id. at 127.
399. Id. at 131.
400. Id. Prior to the adoption of zoning, lots in the 10 communities ranged in size from 13,500
square feet to 5 acres. Id. at 130.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Under nonexclusive programs, requests are made for changes in minimum lot size (bulk
restriction) while under exclusive zoning schemes, use amendments are sought.
404. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966). Governor Tom McCall of Oregon once noted,
I don't think the seeds of its [zoning] not working are within the process itself.
They are within the weaknesses of the human beings who are trying to do the zoning.
It is this loss of backbone and this granting of waivers and changing from a con-
servative use or a residential use to a commercial use, absolutely unjustified by the
merits of the case but caused by the pressures that I think have given zoning whatever
bad aspects it possesses.
Hearings on S. 268, supra note 135, at 50.
405. Guidebook, supra, note 126, at 133.
406. Id. at 135-36.
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corn land rates 100.4 During the period from 1976-1979, when soils
with CSR of 70 or above were zoned agricultural,4 8 officials received
106 rezoning requests, 45 of which involved prime land. Although 17 of
the 45 were granted, ten of those cases involved land that, despite its
CSR, was "not suitable for economic farming."4o9 NALS thus concluded
that county officials "followed the purpose and intent of the agricultural
district, denying almost all those rezonings which would take good land
out of production, and approving most of those which were poorly suited
to agriculture and well suited to non-agricultural use." 41° It thus appears
that existing agricultural zoning systems are performing their intended
function of greatly reducing the conversion of agricultural land.41'
That conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, in the communities
surveyed by NALS, area-wide land speculation has been redirected into
designated development areas.4 12 Surprisingly, developers support the
programs since they now enjoy certainty as to the location of development.
They can confine their activities to those designated areas which, when
properly planned, provide sufficient room for anticipated growth.
413
Finally, farmers in the surveyed communities give zoning, which sig-
nificantly limits their economic options, at least "grudging accept-
ance. "414
407. "Corn Suitability Ratings (CSR) is a system of rating soils, on a scale of 5 (for
soils of the lowest productivity) to which 100 is reserved for those soils: (A) Located
in areas of most favorable weather conditions for Iowa, (B) That have high yield
potential, and (C) That can be continuously used for row crop production with little
soil erosion. This soil rating reflects the physical and chemical properties of the soil
in terms of soil productivity for the growth of com. An individual CSR is assigned
to each mapping unit at an average management level and reflects the integrated
effect of numerous factors that influence the potential yields and frequency that the
soil can be used for row-crop (corn) production. Ratings are prepared on an individual
county basis as part of the soil survey program by soil scientists of the Iowa State
Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station in Ames and by the Soil
Conservation Service."
THE BLACK HAWK COUNTY, IOWA EXPERIENCE IN PRESERVING THE FARMLAND AND
THE FARMER 2 (Unpublished pamphlet).
408. The 35 acre, large lot ordinance has since been strengthened by reducing the agricultural
CSR to 60. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 132. The amendment illustrates NALS's conclusion that
in addition to withstanding rezoning pressure, the ten communities often acted to tighten restrictions.
Id. at 132.
409. Id. at 133-34. Analogizing from the discussion of other programs, the unsuitability may
have been due to the size of the parcel or its proximity to an already developed area. Id.
410. Id. at 134.
411. NALS did, however, discover that, at least in the California counties, parcel splitting, (e.g.,
dividing land among family members) was not as well controlled as rezoning, due primarily to lack
of consensus on criteria. Id. at 136-38.
412. Id. at 142.
413. Id. at 140.
414. Id.
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Because of the possibility of limited building, farmers recognized
that the agricultural zoning does not curtail all development, but
rather restricts it to those lands best suited to non-agricultural use.
Thus, on the one hand, the farmer's investment in agriculture is
protected from major non-agricultural adjoining uses, and on the
other hand, the farmer is able to realize some development value in
the land.415
Despite these apparent successes, I submit that zoning by itself will
not adequately ensure the preservation of agricultural land. While some
degree of planning is inherent in any such scheme, zoning, like the other
programs reviewed in this article, will prove most effective as an element
of a system of broad-based land use planning.
First, the very nature of most agricultural zoning programs points up
the necessity of careful long-range planning. By far the greatest number
of communities currently using zoning rely upon large lot nonexclusive
schemes. Since these ordinances permit nonfarm uses as a matter of right,
the systems
can result in the chopping up of good agricultural land into minimum
sized lots. Given sufficient volume, such practices are likely to gen-
erate the same frictions and nuisance suits that the large minimum
lot sizes are designed to curtail. Further, as non-farm dwellings begin
to dot the agricultural area, local officials will come under increasing
pressure to lower the minimum lot size and thereby accelerate the
disintegration of the agricultural sector.
Thus, large-lot and fixed and sliding scale area-based allocation
ordinances may temporarily deter non-agricultural development in
agricultural areas, but in the long run, the validity of these techniques,
unless permitted densities are significantly lowered, is questiona-
ble.416
Second, the coordination of zoning with a well developed plan is
necessary to provide ongoing guidance for land use decisions. Although
the NALS survey found that rezoning decisions were generally consistent
with local plans, the experience of Sacramento County, California, an
expanding urban area, has been markedly different.
In 1973, Sacramento County adopted a growth plan establishing, among
other things, permanent agriculture zones to accommodate long term
agricultural uses; and agriculture-urban reserves, designed for agricultural
use at least until 1990, but with conversion to urban use possible before
that date. 41'7 Despite the caveat that rural residential subdivisions com-
415. Id.
416. Id. at 145.
417. Johnston, Successful Plan Implementation: The Growth Phasing Program of Sacramento
County, 44 J. AM INST. PLANNERS 412, 414 (1978).
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posed of parcels of less than two acres were to be "discouraged" in the
reserve areas, the county board of supervisors approved a substantial
number of such developments.4"' In order to preserve these areas as
locations for orderly future growth, the board was compelled to redefine
the reserve area so as to exclude rural residential development.
Under the county's general plan, the reserve areas then became inel-
igible for county funded urban services, and urban land uses or divisions
of land into parcels of less than ten acres were prohibited altogether.419
More importantly, the amendment had the effect of elevating the barrier
against rural residential development from approval of a subdivision to
the requirement of a general plan amendment.42 The change was espe-
cially important because California both accords the general plan the
force of law by requiring all zoning to be in conformity therewith,42" ' and
prohibits its amendment more than three times per year."' The new
scheme has been significantly more effective in excluding development
from urban reserve areas.423
Apart from its effectiveness in the Sacramento case, California's plan-
ning scheme provides the framework necessary for orderly growth which
in turn facilitates the preservation of agricultural land. First, unlike many
states which make planning permissive,4 24 California mandates the prep-
aration of county general plans. Officials must give serious thought to
the demands inherent in future growth. Second, assuming the plan at-
tempts to strike an appropriate balance between orderly growth and farm-
land preservation, requiring consistency between the plan and zoning
precludes sporadic rezonings which can destroy farmland by generating
pockets of development demanding governmental services, which in turn
pave the way for further development. Instead, development which does
occur will be within the net of the community's planned-for growth.
Finally, by permitting only three amendments per year, proposals are
consolidated so as to encourage officials to consider their cumulative
effects, 42 again contributing to orderly growth. The California program
demonstrates that the preservation of farmland can be best accomplished
through a system based on broad-based land use planning.
In addition, a system which links zoning with broad-based planning
should be insulated from constitutional attack. State court decisions up-
holding open space and agricultural zoning against "taking" allegations
426
418. Id. at 420.
419. Id. at 416, 420.
420. Id. at 420.
421. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860(a) (West Supp. 1966-80).
422. Id. §65361.
423. Johnston, supra note 417, at 421.
424. E.g., New York. See supra, note 266.
425. Johnston, supra note 417, at 420.
426. See supra, note 378.
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have noted their state's preservation policies.427 Similarly, at least one
court, though not confronted with direct challenge to agricultural zoning,
has noted the state's policy of farmland protection in an exclusionary
428zoning case.
Most importantly, in the case of Agins v. City of Tiburon,429 the United
States Supreme Court took special note of the planning aspects of the
scheme in question. Upholding a California Supreme Court decision that
property had not been "taken" by an ordinance limiting development to
one acre lots, the Court noted:
In this case, the zoning ordinances substantially advance legitimate
governmental goals. The State of California has determined that the
development of local open-space plans will discourage the "pre-
mature and unnecessary conversion of open-space land to urban
uses." . . . The specific zoning regulations at issue are exercises of
the city's police power to protect the residents of Tiburon from the
ill-effects of urbanization. Such governmental purposes long have
been recognized as legitimate. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City. . .. 430
Taken together with its decision in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City43' (to be discussed later)432 which upheld the designation
of Grand Central Station as a landmark subject to development restric-
tions, the Supreme Court's decision in Agins leaves little doubt that well
planned agricultural zoning programs are valid.433
Finally, and perhaps most important, zoning, by itself, is likely to be
ineffective because it is not popular with farmers and will be difficult to
enact. Unlike the city dweller who probably owns only the lot on which
his home stands, the farmer has a substantial investment in land, and will
be far more profoundly affected by a zoning ordinance.434 Agricultural
zoning, even in combination with a California type planning scheme,
severely limits a farmer's ability to capitalize on his primary asset without
providing offsetting benefits. Notwithstanding the "grudging" support
found by NALS in already zoned communities, it will inevitably be less
acceptable than programs which, in some manner, compensate the farmer
for that loss of control.
Such broader programs as the Wisconsin Farmland Preservation Law,
which links zoning and planning to tax relief,435 and the Minnesota Met-
427. E.g., Gisler v. County of Modena, supra note 378.
428. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, supra note 380.
429. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
430. Id. at 261.
431. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
432. See infra, text accompanying notes 579-87.
433. Accord Keene, supra note 8, at 635-47.
434. See supra, text accompanying notes 88-89.
435. See supra, text accompanying notes 270-88.
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ropolitan Agricultural Preserves Act, which combines zoning with pro-
tection from government action that would interfere with farming,436 take
into account the special "goals, values and assumptions" of the farmer.437
They should, therefore, possess far greater potential for preserving farm-
land than does agricultural zoning.
Similarly, Purchase of Development Rights (PDR) and Transfer of
Development Rights (TDR) programs, discussed in the next sections,
which compensate landowners for the surrender of their development
rights, preserve farmland because they address the unique concerns of
the farmer.
PURCHASE OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
Unlike zoning, which preserves farmland by regulating development
but fails to account for the special needs of the farmer, the programs
discussed in the remaining two sections protect agricultural lands by
providing farmers with financial benefits which offset the urge to succumb
to development pressure.
Conceptually, development rights programs simply treat the right to
develop land as an incident of ownership, one of the "bundle of rights"
which a fee simple landowner possesses. However, in contrast to differ-
ential assessment systems which simply ignore that value for tax purposes,
PDR and TDR programs compensate the fanner for legally severing the
rights. The effect of this less-than-fee-purchase is roughly equivalent to
the granting of a negative easement by the landowner; he agrees not to
use the land in a certain way, in this case, not to develop beyond current
use.438 Under the Connecticut PDR statute, for example, the owner gives
up the power to ". . . develop, construct on, sell, lease, or otherwise
improve the agricultural land for uses that result in rendering such land
no longer agricultural land .... "4"9 This section will discuss Purchase
of Development Rights programs under which the rights are purchased
by a governmental unit, and the next section will discuss Transfer of
Development Rights systems under which the rights are sold on the open
market.
While PDR schemes are relatively new,' 0 they are the direct descen-
dants of programs for the collection of scenic or conservation easements
436. See supra, text accompanying notes 339-73.
437. See supra, text accompanying notes 75, 88-89.
438. The owner of a negative easement has "the power to prevent the servient owner [the farmer]
from doing on his premises acts which, but for the easement, the servient owner would be privileged
to do." 3 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, 405.
439. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26bb(d) (West Supp. 1982).
440. The concept was first popularized by the writings of William H. Whyte. THE LAST LAND-
SCAPE (1968); OPEN SPACE ACTION, THE OUTDOOR RECREATION RESOURCES REV.
COMM. REP. NO. 15, (1962); SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CONSER-
VATION EASEMENTS, URB. L. INST., TECH. BULL. NO. 36 (1959).
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used by the National Park Service and a number of states to protect
particularly sensitive landscapes."' As early as the 1930s, scenic ease-
ments were purchased along the Blue Ridge Parkway in Virginia and the
Natchez Trace Parkway in Mississippi, Alabama and Tennessee. Although
some of the programs were abandoned in the early 1950s,2 the federal
government still maintains the authority to purchase easements in various
locations. 443 Wisconsin employed one of the first state PDR programs to
preserve scenery along the Great River Road paralleling the Mississippi,
and to acquire lands for public hunting, fishing, and trapping.4" More
recently, a number of states have authorized the acquisition of conser-
vation or open space easements by purchase 5 or donation. 46
A small number of states and counties have developed PDR schemes
for the preservation of farmland;" 7 nationwide, 10,300 acres of agricul-
tural land have been preserved by this method. 448 The first such program
was enacted by Suffolk County, New York in 1974.4 9 It will serve as the
principal model for this discussion.
441. See generally, Cunningham, Scenic Easements In The Highway Beautification Program, 45
DEN. L.J. 168, 181-88 (1968); Evelth, An Appraisal of Techniques to Preserve Open Space, 9
VILL. L. REV. 559, 565-68 (1964); Roe, supra note 72, at 429-31.
In addition, the Housing Act of 1961 provided grants to state and local governments "to encourage
more economic and desirable urban development, to assist in preserving areas and properties of
historic or architectural value, and to help provide necessary recreational, conservation, and scenic
areas." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1500(d)(1976).
The act as originally introduced encompassed agricultural land "in or adjacent to an urban area"
having "economic or social value as a means of shaping the character, direction and timing of
community development." S. 1922, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., § 606a (1961). Senator Williams of New
Jersey, one of the bill's chief sponsors, had hoped it would be used to control urban sprawl, channel
development, and implement greenbelt areas, but in enacting the bill as amended, most members
of Congress felt they were authorizing funds for park and recreational lands. Krasnowiecki & Paul,
The Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 213-15 (1961).
The grant authority was terminated in 1975. 42 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1976).
442. Cunningham, supra note 441, at 182-83.
443. E.g., Cuyahoga Valley Nat'l Recreation Area, 16 U.S.C. § 460ff-1(c) (1976); Wild Rivers
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1277(b)(1976); Roe, supra note 72.
444. Jordahl, Conservation and Scenic Easements: An Experience Resume, 39 LAND ECON.
343 (1963); Note, Progress and Problems in Wisconsin's Scenic and Conservation Easement Pro-
gram, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 352.
445. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6950-54 (West 1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8A-1 to 8A-55,
13:8B-1 to 8B-9 (1979 and Supp. 1980-81).
446. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51050-51097 (West Supp. 1981).
447. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26aa-26hh (1982); MD. AGRIC. CODE § 2-505-
515 (Supp. 1981), see generally, Neilsen, Preservation of Maryland Farmland:A CurrentAssessment,
8 U. BALT. L. REV. 429 (1979); King County, Wash. Ord. 4341 (June 27, 1979), see generally,
Comment, Agricultural Land Preservation: Washington's Approach, 15 GONZ. L. REV. 765, 786-
91 (1980); Suffolk County, New York Local Law No. 16-1981 (signed by County Exec. April 6,
1981).
448. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 156.
449. Local Law Relating to the Acquisition of Development Rights in Agricultural Land, Suffolk
County, N.Y. Local Law No. 19-1974 (1974), reprinted in Newton and Boast, supra note 107, at
190, n. 4. The law has been superseded by Local Law No. 16-1981, supra note 447.
Both laws were passed under a New York enabling statute which provides that the acquisition of
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The Suffolk County Program
Although Suffolk County is New York's most productive agricultural
county,450 its location on the eastern end of Long Island makes it especially
vulnerable to the urban sprawl emanating from New York City. Nearly
70,000 acres of farmland were converted to nonagricultural uses between
1950 and 1972, 4"' and in 1975, agricultural use value of land averaged
$1500 per acre, while market value averaged $7500 per acre. 452 Some
market values were as high as $20,000 per acre. 453
The Suffolk County PDR program emerged from a two year study
which rejected other alternatives.454 In particular, the agricultural district-
ing program, already operative in New York State, was rejected primarily
because its restrictions on governmental action455 limited control over
"comprehensive resources planning ' 456 and because the county would
have been unable to prevent conversion prompted by irresistible offers.457
Under the plan,458 landowners who wish to sell their development
rights459 submit asking prices to the County Executive. The county farm-
land committee, composed in part of 19 members from all towns within
the county, then evaluates the offers. Top priority is given to land currently
under cultivation which is under imminent threat of development. Prime
lands46 are preferred, and while no minimum number of acres is required,
tracts of 200 acres or more are given preference. Unreasonably high offers
are summarily rejected. Following private firm appraisals of acceptable
parcels, contracts are negotiated and, if approved by the county legis-
lature, are executed and recorded.46" ' As a part of the contract of sale, the
landowner covenants to use the underlying fee only for agricultural pur-
interest or rights in real property for the preservation of open spaces or areas (including agricultural
lands) constitutes a public purpose for which county or local government funds may be expended.
N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 247 (McKinney 1976).
450. Newton & Boast, supra note 107, at 193.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 211, n. 112.
453. Peterson & McCarthy, Farmland Preservation by Purchase of Development Rights: The
Long Island Experience, 26 DE PAUL L. REV. 447, 458, n. 35 (1977).
454. Newton & Boast, supra note 107, at 198-206.
455. See supra, text accompanying notes 305-09.
456. Newton & Boast, supra note 107, at 201.
457. Id. at 202. Sixty percent of the county's farmland was owned by nonfarmers who were
assumed to be holding the land pending further increases in value. Peterson & McCarthy, supra
note 453, at 454, n. 22.
458. See generally, Cooperative Extension of Suffolk County, Suffolk County's Farmland Pres-
ervation Program 8-9 (1979).
459. Development rights means "the permanent legal interest and right to permit, require or
restrict the use of the premises exclusively for agricultural production [as defined by the Agricultural
Districting Act] and the right to prohibit or restrict the use of the premises for any purposes other
than agricultural production." LOCAL LAW NO. 16-1981 § 3(c).
460. See supra, note 8.
461. Farmland Preservation Program, supra note 458, at 7-10; Newton & Boast, supra note 107,
at 208-09.
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poses,46z and the agreement runs with the land.463 Once acquired, devel-
opment rights may not be sold by the county except by local law
recommended by the farmland committee and approved by mandatory
referendum.46
Effectiveness of the Plan
As originally envisioned, the Suffolk County program was to enable
the county to purchase the development rights to 15,000 acres at a total
cost of $55 million.465 As of April, 1981, the county had expended $12
million of an initial $21 million bond issue466 for the acquisition of ap-
proximately 3,400467 acres at an average cost of $3,120 per acre.468 A
second submission of offers had been narrowed and appraisal ordered on
over 3,000 acres bearing an asking cost of nearly $18 million.469
In at least one critical respect the Suffolk County PDR plan, like zoning,
is far superior to differential assessment and agricultural districting-it
is able to protect the most vulnerable farmland. The system overcomes
that major inadequacy in those other schemes by essentially making a
doubly irresistible offer to the farmer whose land is threatened. He can
collect the land's development potential and still continue farming.
470
Moreover, unlike use restrictions under the systems reviewed thus far,
restraints on development under a PDR program are permanent.47'
462. Newton & Boast, supra note 107, at 209.
463. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 247(4)(McKinney Supp. 1981). The provision was necessitated
by the common law rule forbidding the burden of easements "in gross" from running with the land.
See generally, Cunningham, supra note 441, at 256. Most other PDR statutes are not so explicit,
but simply authorize the purchase of less-than-fee interests.
464. LOCAL LAW NO. 16-1981, § 5.
465. COHALAN, OPEN SPACE POLICY: REPORT TO THE SUFFOLK COUNTY LEGIS-
LATURE (February, 1980).
466. Id.
467. Id. For a detailed statement of bids received and appraised, see Peterson & McCarthy supra
note 453, at 458-59, n. 35-36.
468. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 163. The figure includes payments to landowners plus cost
of appraisals, surveys, title searches, and other administrative costs. Id.
469. Update on the County Farmland Program, Suffolk County Agricultural News, August, 1980.
In October, 1980, the county legislature added 35 parcels to the appraisal list. County Farmland
Program Update. Id., November, 1980; Conversation with David Newton, Land Use Specialist,
Suffolk County, April 28, 1981.
470. As previously noted, participation by land owners is voluntary. Thus, it might be argued
that landowners can defeat the plan by holding out for expected higher values in the future. As to
a farmer, the argument is correct although he would continue to pay taxes based on the market value.
By contrast, the nonfarmer holdout's development rights may be subject to condemnation in the
final phase of the program. At that time, the county may use its eminent domain power "to fill out
the blank spaces" in and around already participating property. Land owned by active farmers will
be exempt. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 158; Newton & Boast, supra note 107, at 210.
471. The restrictions must, however, be enforced. Disagreement over the meaning of "agricultural
production" has prompted Suffolk County to require a permit for the erection of "structures" on
participating land. New Farmland Owners Experience Use Roadblocks, Suffolk County Agricultural
News, August, 1980; LOCAL LAW NO. 16-1981, § 6(e)(4).
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In addition, the cash payments have encouraged farmers to expand
their operations either by investing in new equipment or buying additional
farmland which, now restricted to farming, can be purchased at use value
prices. Thus after the first phase of purchases, Suffolk County farmers
purchased 390 acres from nonfarmer landowners who had sold their
development rights to the county.472 The sale of development rights also
eliminates the tax squeeze problem which initially gave rise to differential
assessment programs. The landowner can be taxed only on what he owns,
the right to use the land for agricultural purposes."'
PDR programs address the concerns of the agricultural community and
they unquestionably preserve farmland. Nonetheless, their utility is se-
verely limited. Largely because of their cost, such programs are inherently
measures of last resort, born out of a sense of urgency.474 Obviously,
regulating land use is less expensive and burdensome than purchasing
property rights, but in areas where the development pressure on farmland
is the greatest, expectation interests will have risen so substantially that
zoning, for instance, will not be politically feasible.475 Yet it is in those
urban fringe areas, where PDR programs are needed most, that devel-
opment rights carry the highest purchase price. Moreover, the overall
costs will be substantially greater than merely the purchase price of the
rights. Interest payments on the bonds, which are the primary financing
mechanism for PDR systems,476 must be included.477 Finally, while cash
outlays will increase, tax revenues will decrease because of the reduction
in the assessment base.478
Thus, even in areas where there exists a strong desire to protect farm-
land, PDR programs will be politically controversial. For example, in
the late 1970s the State of New Jersey abandoned a two-year pilot program479
472. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 158.
473. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 247(3)(McKinney 1976) provides that after severence of devel-
opment rights, the valuation "shall take into account and be limited by the limitation on the future
use of the land."
474. Conversation with John Wickham, Suffolk County farmer, February 10, 1981; Guidebook,
supra note 126, at 167.
475. Id. at 148.
476. Id. at 155. Wisconsin used a one cent per pack cigarette tax to finance its scenic easements
program. Jordahl, supra note 444. The Maryland program receives two-thirds of any rollback penalty
levied under the Farmland Assessment Act. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 155.
477. Suffolk County issued thirty-year bonds bearing a 5.9% interest rate. Newton and Boast,
supra note 107, at 206.
478. See note 473 and accompanying text, supra. A tax "shift" (note 222 supra) thus occurs
simultaneously with a cash outlay.
In some instances, a community could conclude that a PDR program is economically preferable
to development, however. For example, housing in Suffolk County in the mid 1970s was less
expensive than in other areas of the country. Planners concluded that conversion of farmland to low
or moderate income housing would have cost the country more for governmental services than it
would lose due to the PDR tax base reduction. Newton and Boast, supra note 107, at 207.
479. N.J. STAT. ANN. §4:IB-1 (West Supp. 1982).
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before any development rights could be purchased. Even though five
million dollars had been appropriated originally, a proposal to purchase
1,666 acres in Burlington County at an average cost of $2,340 was halted
in part because of concern over the projected costs of expanding the
program state-wide. 4 In Suffolk County, the two-thirds vote of the county
legislature required for approval of a bond issue took five months to
secure.
481
Furthermore, cost will not be the only consideration. In developing
urban fringe areas, where PDR programs are most likely to be needed,
the priority for other public projects is also likely to be the greatest. PDR
programs may be difficult to justify in the face of the need for a hospital
or a sewer system.482 Not surprisingly, the Suffolk County program created
controversy because it was implemented simultaneously with the con-
struction of a major sewer project.483
Taken together, the limitations inherent in effective PDR schemes clearly
indicate that they cannot be effective as the sole approach to agricultural
land preservation. A recent report by Peter Cohalan, the Suffolk County
Executive, stated: "If past experience is any indication of future accom-
plishment, it is clear that linking the entire program to one means of
acquisition will fall short of the objective, namely to protect a sufficient
amount of Suffolk farms to insure the vitality of the agricultural industry
itself." '484 While recommending that the nine million dollars remaining
under the initial bond issue be committed to the purchase of phase II
properties,48 Mr. Cohalan's report strongly urged the use of agricultural
districting" 6 and density modification, a form of clustering,"' to supple-
ment the PDR program. Using all three devices, he predicted that up to
30,000 acres of farmland might be preserved, whereas PDR alone would
preserve only about six thousand acres.488 A recent legislative evaluation
of Connecticut's statewide PDR program489 reached a similar conclusion:
480. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 158.
481. Newton and Boast, supra note 107, at 213.
482. Comment, Easements to Preserve Open Space Land, I Ecology L.Q. 728, 744 (1971).
483. Newton, Saving Prime Farmland: The Suffolk County Experience. Cooperative Extension
pamphlet 3-4 (1979).
484. Cohalan, supra note 465.
485. Id.
486. Two districts, containing 4,173 acres, already exist in the county. Summary, supra note 311.
487. Under such a scheme, the owner could convert only a certain percentage of his property;
the remainder would be placed under a nondevelopment covenant. The Town of Southampton, in
Suffolk County, has proposed a plan permitting development of 35% of a tract along existing roads.
In addition to saving farmland, the more cohesive development will reduce the cost of governmental
services. Cohalan predicts that a county wide plan could protect 15,000-20,000 acres of farmland.
Cohalan, supra note 465.
488. Id.
489. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26aa-26hh (West Supp. 1982).
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absent "an immediately funded full scale purchase program, no one policy
tool is capable of preserving farmland."490
It is not the purpose of this article to propose specific programs which
might include a PDR component. However, as the discussion of other
types of programs has made clear, the effectiveness of whatever program
is chosen will be enhanced when it is integrated with a system of broad-
based land use planning. Thus, to the extent that a PDR plan is viable,
either on its own or in conjunction with other techniques, the large sums
involved will be most productively spent when planning precedes pur-
chase.
The criteria utilized by Suffolk County to select parcels for participation
in the program491 constitute a type of informal plan. By prefering tracts
of at least 200 acres contiguous to other farmland, the plan attempts to
ensure the protection of a certain critical mass of land needed for an
efficient farming operation4 92 as well as to provide opportunity for ex-
pansion. Selection of Class I and II soils conserves the best land for
agricultural production, thereby directing development toward poorer quality
soil. Finally, by seeking to purchase buffered zones bounded by roads or
open space, the county is able to "separate farming operations from other
noncompatible land uses."4"3 Given the relatively limited extent of the
Suffolk County PDR program, and the fact that so far all purchases have
been made simultaneously, such a planning scheme has probably been
adequate. If, however, the use of density modification increases, as sug-
gested by the County Executive,4 94 a more comprehensive plan would be
advisable.495
In contrast to a local system, a statewide PDR program at best can be
hit-or-miss without broad-based planning, a generalization understood by
the architects of the Connecticut program. In addition to establishing the
mechanism for purchasing development rights, the Connecticut PDR
statute496 provides for the preparation of a series of maps inventorying
active and inactive farmland, types of crops in current production, local
zoning, existing and planned sewer and water lines, and forest or open
490. Sunset Review: Agricultural Lands Preservation Pilot Program. Hartford: Connecticut Gen-
eral Assembly, Legislative Program Review and Investigations Committee 30 (1980). The report
recommends enabling legislation to permit agricultural districting and a TDR plan, as well as
imposition of a conveyance tax on land removed from the differential assessment program.
491. See generally, Farmland Preservation Program, supra note 458, at 7.
492. Lapping, Bevins & Herbers, Differential Assessment And Other Techniques to Preserve
Missouri's Farmland, 42 MO. L. REV. 369, 385-86 (1977).
493. Farmland Preservation, supra note 458, at 7.
494. See supra, text accompanying note 487.
495. Suffolk County is in fact covered by a comprehensive plan developed by the Long Island
Regional Planning Board. Conversation with David Newton, Land Use Specialist, May 5, 1981.
496. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26aa-26hh (West Supp. 1982).
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land. 497 The act also provides for the preparation of a food plan which
1) analyzes the demand for and supply availability of Connecticut grown
food at 10 and 20 year intervals and 2) recommends priorities with respect
to agricultural production and land requirements.498
Since the Connecticut program was enacted initially as a pilot pro-
gram, 4 the planning sections did not apply to the first phase of purchases.
The 1980 Sunset Review recommending continuation of the program5"°
did urge, however, an amendment requiring coordination of the Food
Plan and mapping data, along with information on land covered by dif-
ferential assessment, as a means of assuring a "systematic [PDR] selection
process." 5"' The report further recommended that local zoning and plan-
ning commissions be consulted for suggestions on sites suitable for pres-
ervation and for comments on applications for purchases within their
towns."0
The Connecticut legislature should seriously consider the enactment
of the suggested amendments. The Food Plan which has been developed
recommends increased agricultural production requiring, by the year 2000,
permanent preservation of 83,500 acres of prime cropland." 3 Over 80
percent of the land would be used for dairy farming, the rest for production
of fruits and vegetables." ° The authors of the plan estimate that, including
the "adjacent pastures, woods, natural drainage areas and open space
areas" 505 required to support that amount of cropland, a total of approx-
imately 300,000 acres will need to be preserved.506 Even utilizing a
"comprehensive farmland preservation" program, the "single most im-
portant aspect" of which is the PDR program,0 7 meeting such a goal will
no doubt be difficult.50 8 Without broad-based planning, it will be impos-
sible.
The same may be said of any PDR program. While the goals of most
such systems will not be as ambitious as that of Connecticut, their ef-
497. Id. § 22-26dd.
498. Id. § 22-26ee.
499. Id. § 22-26cc (West Supp. 1979).
500. Sunset Review, supra note 490.
501. Id. at 34.
502. Id.
503. Fellows & Cody, A FOOD PRODUCTION PLAN FOR CONNECTICUT, 1980-2000.
CONN. AGRIC. STATION, Bull. No. 454 (October, 1979)(cited in Sunset Review, supra note 490,
at 10-11).
504. Id.
505. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26aa (West Supp. 1982).
506. Supra note 503.
507. Sunset Review, supra note 490, at 33.
508. As of Autumn, 1980, Connecticut had acquired development rights in 2,585 acres at an
average cost of $1,600 per acre. Guidebook, supra note 126, at 157, 163. Over nine million dollars
is currently appropriated for the project. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26hh (1983 Conn. Acts
June 83-33 (Spec. Sess.)).
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fectiveness will nonetheless depend directly upon the degree of planning
involved.
TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
As previously noted, development rights also are severed from the land
under a TDR system but, instead of being purchased by a governmental
unit, the rights are transferred on the open market for use in designated
receiving zones. Such a system offers benefits to both buyers and sellers.
The purchaser may develop his land more intensely than would otherwise
be permitted and, as with the PDR system, the seller who is compensated
for the restrictions attached to his property can reinvest the proceeds in
more land or equipment. In contrast, however, to expensive PDR systems,
TDR programs require only start-up expenditures of public funds . 9 They
also facilitate, as PDR programs do not, needed or desired development;
growth is thus shifted away from prime agricultural areas to more ap-
propriate locales. Finally, while PDR programs essentially "lock up"
development rights, thus removing them from the tax rolls, TDR pro-
grams, by using the rights in another location, avoid a reduction in the
tax base.
Although initially developed as a technique to preserve urban landmarks
by transferring air rights,51° TDR schemes were soon proposed for the
preservation of open space lands5 ' and environmentally sensitive areas.5"2
That agricultural TDR programs were first introduced on the township
level5"3 may account for the fact that, nationwide, very few transactions
have occurred;5"4 the areas involved were probably too small to provide
a market for intensified development. By contrast, systems recently de-
509. At the outset of such programs, a development rights "bank" may be necessary to help
create a private market for the rights. The Montgomery County, Maryland bank is publicly funded,
see infra, text accompanying notes 528-33, but is required to sell off any rights it has purchased
prior to its expiration of authority and is expected to recover the cost of initial funding. Proposal
ForA Bank To Assist In Agricultural Preservation (The Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning
Commission/Montgomery County Planning Board, 1981); Bill No. 59-80, introduced in the Mont-
gomery County Legislature on November 18, 1982. The bill was enacted without substantive changes.
Conversation with Dale Price, Montgomery County Planning Board, August 20, 1982.
510. Costonis, SPACE ADRIFT(1974); The Chicago Plan:Incentive Zoning and The Preservation
of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972). New York City has adopted such a system,
NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, ch. 8A, § 205-1.0 et seq. (1976) (described in
Penn Central v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
511. Rose, A Proposalfor the Separation and Marketability of Development Rights as a Technique
to Preserve Open Space, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 635 (1974).
512. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973).
513. E.g., Buckingham Twp., Bucks Co., Pa.; Sunderland Twp., Franklin Co., Mass. A few
towns and counties have also developed TDR plans. E.g., Town of Southampton, Suffolk Co., N.Y.;
Calvert Co., Md. For a complete listing, see Guidebook, supra, note 126, at 176.
514. At the time the Guidebook was published, only five transactions protecting 184 acres had
occurred. Id. at 177.
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veloped in Montgomery County, Maryland and the New Jersey Pinelands
area, which serve as the models for this discussion, cover areas possessing
both large amounts of farmland and centers of intensifying development.
The Montgomery County Plan
Montgomery County, Maryland, situated immediately to the northwest
of Washington, D.C., has experienced development pressure since the
mid-1950s. The market value of farmland has increased from about $700
per acre in 1959 to approximately $3,500 per acre in 1979. Over 80,000
acres of the 1950 agricultural base of 213,000 acres had been shifted to
nonfarm ownership by 1979.' This large-scale conversion has occurred
despite Maryland's differential assessment, agricultural districting and ease-
ment acts, and the county's five acre rural zoning ordinance. 51 6 Responding
to this "threat," in 1980 the county adopted a Functional Master Plan for
the Preservation of Agriculture and Rural Open Space.51 7 In addition to
recommending increased use of state farmland preservation techniques, the
plan combines a TDR program covering 73,000 acres (agricultural reserve)518
with a rural clustering component on 26,000 acres (rural open space areas)
where development already has eroded portions of the critical mass of
farmland. 519 This article will consider only the TDR component.
Under the plan, land within the agricultural reserve, the sending zone,
will be assigned marketable development rights in a ratio of one residential
uni52 per five acres. The landowner may then sell some or all of those
units to a landowner in a designated receiving zone. Upon transfer, a
restrictive easement, limiting future development to the number of rights
retained, will be filed in the county records office and thus be binding
on all future owners.5 ' While the program is voluntary in that a farmer
is not compelled to sell his development rights, severe restrictions on his
own ability, or that of a successor in interest, to develop encourage him
to do so. A fanner who does not sell his development rights may not
build at the sending ratio of one residential unit per five acres but only
at a base density of one dwelling unit per 25 acres. 2
515. THE MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING COMMISSION,
FUNCTIONAL MASTER PLAN FOR THE PRESERVATION OF AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL
OPEN SPACE IN MONTGOMERY COUNTY 12, 14 (October, 1980) (hereinafter Master Plan).
516. Id. at 12.
517. Id.
518. Id. at 46.
519. Id. at 39-40. Rural clustering retains open space by concentrating a parcel's permissible
development on a portion of the tract, leaving the remainder as open space.
520. All existing TDR programs, with the exception of Buckingham Twp., are directed only at
residential development. Supra note 513.
521. Master Plan, supra note 515, at 42-44.
522. Id. at 43. Each building lot contains a minimum of 40,000 square feet, approximately one
acre Id.
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For example, the owner of 100 acres of agricultural reserve land would
be assigned 20 rights which he would sell to a receiving zone owner. If,
however, instead of selling those rights, the farmer chose to develop his
land, he would be able to construct only four dwellings, one for each 25
acres. If our hypothetical landowner sold five rights, representing 25
acres, and retained 15, representing 75 acres, he could either sell the
remaining rights at a later time or construct three dwellings, one for each
25 acres for which he has not sold the development rights.
Receiving zones are not designated by the master plan but will be the
product of further study and revision of more localized master plans.
While receiving zones are a "key element of the TDR concept, 523 their
identification involves primarily urban concerns. The Master Plan thus
provides that they be "consistent with environmental, transportation,
housing and population guidelines" of the various community master
plans. 24 When established, the receiving zones, like the transfer zone,
will be assigned two densities: the base density or maximum level to
which a tract may be developed without the use of transferred development
rights, and the higher optional density to which parcels utilizing the rights
may be developed.5 2" Developers wishing to utilize transferred rights will
submit a subdivision plan which will be reviewed for conformity with
county and local general plans and subdivision regulations.5 26 Hypothet-
ically, a base density might permit the developer to build one dwelling
per two acres, whereas, using rights purchased from the agricultural
reserve, he might be able to construct two dwellings per acre.5 27 The
ability to develop to four times the normal density will serve as the
incentive for the developer to participate in the program.
Finally, since there is unlikely to be a strong private market for the
purchase and sale of development rights until a number of receiving zones
have been designated, Montgomery County has established a Develop-
ment Rights Fund, or "bank," to serve as an interim market substitute.5 28
Funded primarily from real estate transfer and development taxes already
being collected by the county,529 the fund is empowered to guarantee
commercial loans which are secured by development rights and to pur-
chase and sell development rights. 30 While the fund probably is crucial
523. Id. at 44.
524. Id.
525. Id. at 41.
526. Master Plan, supra, note 515, at 88.
527. The example is used by the Master Plan. Id. at 45.
528. Bill No. 59-80, supra note 509. The "bank" concept was first proposed as a part of the
Chicago Plan for Landmark Preservation. Costonis, supra note 510.
529. MONTGOMERY CO. CODE, Art II, ch. 51-19 through 52-27; MD. ANN. CODE, Art 81,
§ 19 (1980). Conversation with Dale Price, supra note 509.
530. Bill No. 59-80, supra note 509.
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to the economic and legal53" ' viability of the Montgomery County Scheme,
it operates only as a back-up mechanism. Before it can guarantee a loan
for purchasing development rights, the fund requires evidence that the
applicant has been unable either to sell the rights on the open market or
to obtain a commercial loan using them as collateral.532 In addition, before
it can buy rights, the fund requires evidence that the Maryland State PDR
program has declined to purchase the development rights. 533
The New Jersey Pinelands Plan
While not differing substantially in form from the Montgomery County
plan, the TDR program developed for the New Jersey Pinelands area is
unique in that it is a component of one of the most comperehensive land
use plans yet developed in the United States. The presence of an almost
one million acre tract534 of largely undeveloped forest area near the center
of the urbanized Northeast led Congress in 1978 to establish the Pinelands
National Reserve. The legislation provided federal funds for planning
and land acquisition and mandated that a comprehensive management
plan be developed by the State of New Jersey and approved by the
Secretary of the Interior. 35 Subsequent action by New Jersey536 resulted
in the establishment of the Pinelands Commission whose Comprehensive
531. See infra, text accompanying notes 590-93.
532. Bill No. 59-80, supra note 509.
533. Id.
534. The reserve encompasses part of seven southern New Jersey counties, and all or parts of
56 municipalities. NEW JERSEY PINELANDS COMMISSION, COMPREHENSIVE MANAGE-
MENT PLAN FOR THE PINELANDS NATIONAL RESERVE (xviii) (1980)(hereinafter Compre-
hensive Plan).
535. 16 U.S.C. §471 (Supp. V 1976). The purposes of the act were:
(1) to protect, preserve and enhance the significant values of the land and water
resources of the Pinelands area;
(2) to encourage and assist the State of New Jersey and its units of local government
in the development of a comprehensive management plan for the Pinelands area
in order to assure orderly public and private development in the area consistent
with the findings of this section;
(3) to provide, during the development of this comprehensive plan, Federal financial
assistance for the acquisition of lands in the Pinelands area that have critical
ecological values which are in immediate danger of being adversely affected or
destroyed;
(4) to encourage and assist the State and its units of local government in developing
a governmental mechanism to implement this comprehensive plan, and to pro-
vide Federal financial assistance for the acquisition of lands consistent with the
comprehensive plan;
(5) to encourage adequate coordination of all government programs affecting the
land and water resources of the Pinelands area.
Id. §471(b).
536. New Jersey Pinelands Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:18A-1 to 29 (West Supp.
1982).
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Management Plan537 was approved by Secretary of Interior Andrus in
January, 1981.38
This all-encompassing conservation plan provides inter alia for the
protection of wetlands and forests, vegetation and wildlife, surface and
ground water, air quality, and agriculture. It establishes additional pro-
grams addressing such problems as waste management, capital improve-
ments, and housing. This article will discuss only the agricultural TDR
program, known as the Pinelands Development Credit Program. 39
In order to describe the program adequately, we must first set out some
of the plan's land use categories. The Pinelands Protection Act itself
establishes two areas within the reserve: The Preservation Area, the 368,000
acre semi-wilderness core determined to be especially vulnerable to en-
vironmental degradation; 4' and the 566,000 acre, more developed sur-
rounding region known as the Protection Area. 42 Generally speaking, the
plan permits greater development in the Protection Area than in the Pres-
ervation Area.
Superimposed upon the two statutorily created zones are a number of
use areas designated by the Pinelands Commission following extensive
study and mapping. This group includes Agricultural Production Areas
primarily devoted to field agricultural uses;543 Special Agricultural Pro-
duction Areas devoted to native horticultural uses, such as berry produc-
tion,5" and Regional Growth Areas. The latter encompass areas which
are "(1) in or adjacent to existing developed areas, (2) experiencing
growth demands and pressure for development, and (3) capable of ac-
commodating development without jeopardizing the most critical ele-
ments of the Pinelands environment." 545 Over 97 percent of agricultural
production acreage is found in the Protection Area;54 6 all Regional Growth
Areas lie within the Protection Area. 47
537. Comprehensive Plan, supra note 534.
538. New York Times, Jan. 17, 1981, at 26, col. 1.
539. Comprehensive Plan, supra note 534, at 210-12, 401-02.
540. Supra note 536.
541. "The Preservation Area District represents that area found by the New Jersey Legislature
to be 'especially vulnerable to the environmental degradation of surface and ground waters which
would be occasioned by the improper development or use thereof,' and 'which constitutes an extensive
and contiguous area of land in its natural state."' Comprehensive Plan, supra note 534, at 195.
542. Id. at xix.
543. Id. The Agricultural Production Areas, located in both the Preservation and Protection Areas,
also include "adjoining lands with soil conditions suitable for those farming activities." Id.
544. Special Agricultural Protection Areas, occurring only in the Preservation Area, also include
adjoining lands utilized for watershed protection. These areas are to be designated at the option of
the municipality. Id.
545. Id. at 196.
546. Id.
547. Id.
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The Pinelands Development Credit Program covers the two agricultural
production areas as well as the whole of the Preservation Area. Section
5-401 of the Comprehensive Management Plan declares:
If land use and development of the Pinelands -is concentrated in
Regional Growth Areas, the Pinelands as a region can tolerate ad-
ditional development without damaging the Pinelands environment.
It is the purpose of this Part to facilitate such patterns of growth and
development by providing landowners in the Preservation Area Dis-
trict, Special Agricultural Production Areas, and Agricultural Pro-
duction Areas with an opportunity to secure an additional beneficial
use of their land without the risk of damaging the essential ecological
character of the Pinelands 48
Preservation Area landowners will receive one development credit for
every 39 acres owned, while agricultural area owners will receive two
credits for every 39 acres. 49 The credits, each representing four bonus
housing units,55 will be sold on the open market for use in receiving
zones, located in Regional Growth Areas. 5 1 As under the Montgomery
County program, each such area will have a base density and a higher
bonus density which may be achieved only by using transferred credits. 52
While these densities are set by the Comprehensive Plan, local govern-
mental units with land in these areas, as a part of their obligation to
implement all aspects of the Comprehensive Plan,553 including the TDR
scheme, are responsible for adopting land use regulations which utilize
the bonus system. 54
Hypothetically, in a regional growth area which the municipality has
zoned for single family homes on one-half acre lots, a 12 acre tract would
support 24 homes. However, when development credits are used, lot size
decreases to one-third acre, and the same tract would support 36 homes.
Since each credit equals four new homes, a developer would need to
548. Id. at 401.
549. Id. § 5-403 at 402. In each case wetlands owners will receive only 0.2 credits per 39 acres.
550. Id. § 5-405 at 402.
551. Id. §5-402 at 401.
552. Id. at 210.
553. Comprehensive Plan, supra, note 534 at 353-60. Section 3-101 declares:
The Pinelands Protection Act is a legislative determination that management and
protection of the essential character and ecological values of the Pinelands require
a regional perspective in the formulation and implementation of land use policies
and regulations. The Act also recognizes, as does this Plan, that local government
participation in the management process is fundamental to achieving the goals and
objectives of the Act. The Act and this Plan contemplate that local governments
will be the principal management entities implementing the Plan, with the Pinelands
Commission providing technical assistance to local authorities, monitoring devel-
opment review and updating the Plan.
Id. at 353.
554. Id. §5-402 at 401, 210-11.
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purchase three credits to be entitled to construct the 12 bonus homes.55
Any transfer must include a deed restriction limiting in perpetuity the
seller's land to designated agricultural uses.556 Although the program does
not compel the farmer to sell his credits, opportunities for development
by him or his successors in interest are even more restricted than in the
Montgomery County program. Residential units will be permitted on 3.2
acre tracts, provided they will be the landowner's principal residence,
that he has not developed a similar unit within the last five years, and
meets certain other requirements . 57 Residential units which are acces-
sories to active agricultural operations may be built at a density of one
per ten acres.58
Finally, the Pinelands Commission has recommended the establishment
of a "bank" with authority similar to that possessed by the Montgomery
County Development Fund. 59 Legislation to implement that recommen-
dation is pending before the New Jersey legislature.56 Meanwhile, the
Burlington County Board of Freeholders has established a credit exchange
board which will have funds available to purchase credits from landowners
experiencing economic hardship. 6'
Effectiveness of the Plans
While neither program had advanced beyond the initial stages of im-
plementation, as of August, 1982, three receiving zones had been offi-
cially designated in Montgomery County.5 62 No requests for financing
555. The example is one given in PINELANDS DEVELOPMENT CREDITS: A LANDOWN-
ER'S GUIDE 4 (New Jersey Pinelands Commission, June, 1982).
556. Comprehensive Plan, supra note 534, at 402.
557. The owner must demonstrate a "cultural, social or economic link to the essential character
of the Pinelands." Id. § 5-304 at 396. The requirement is met by establishing that the parcel in
question was owned by him or a member of his family on Feb. 7, 1979, and either 1) he is a member
of a two generation extended family that has resided in the Pinelands for at least 20 years, or 2) the
primary source of his household income is employment in a Pinelands resource-related activity. Id.
at 396-97.
The section covers only Agricultural Production Areas, although similar requirements apply to all
Preservation lands. Id. § 5-302 at 393.
558. Id. §5-304.
559. Id. at 212.
560. Assembly Bill 1259 by Rep. Lesniak. Conversation with Robert Bembridge, New Jersey
Pinelands Commission, August 20, 1982.
561. PARKER, THE PINELANDS PLAN: A FIRST YEAR REVIEW 7 (New Jersey Pinelands
Comm., Jan. 18, 1982). The legality of the exchange board was upheld in Matlack v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders of Burlington County, L- 69372-81 (Super. Ct., Dec. 6, 1982)(noted in Bozung,
Transfer of Development Rights: Compensation for Owners of Restricted Property, 6 ZONING &
PLANNING L. REP. (June, 1983) at 134). See also, EDF Helps Save N.J. Pinelands Plan for
Fourth Time, EDF Newsletter, at 3, col. 2 (Nov./Dec. 1982).
562. Conversation with Dale Price, Montgomery County Planning Board, August 20, 1982.
Update: by the summer of 1983 local master plans had been amended to provide for over 9000
bonus units. Tustian, Preserving Farming Through Transferable Development Rights: A Case Study
of Montgomery County, Maryland, 4 AMERICAN LAND FORUM 63, 70 (Summer 1983).
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had been received by the Development Rights Fund, but 200 development
rights, representing 1000 acres of protected farmland, had been sold on
the open market at an average purchase price of $4,500 per right. 63 Three
developers had submitted proposals for subdivisions which make use of
transferred rights, and county officials perceive that developers willingly
are accepting the TDR program."
In the summer of 1983, the Planning Director for Montgomery County
wrote:
All the available evidence suggests that this transferable devel-
opment rights system is beginning to work. Over 400 TDR's have
been sold, preserving over 2,000 acres of land in the agricultural
reserve area. Local banks are beginning to recognize TDR's as le-
gitimate instruments of commerce. Realtors have begun to identify
TDR's as a feature of properties described in the multiple listing
system. The local real estate board has requested an opinion from
the state's attorney general, seeking authorization to act as brokers
for land-severed TDR's as stand alone commercial instruments. A
judge has recognized the economic value of TDR's in dividing prop-
erty among two parties in a litigation. A receiving area developer
has said that the TDR option enabled him to reduce the price of his
houses by $10,000 per unit. A land-owner sold 34 acres to the parks
department without keeping the TDR's, saving the government the
cost of the development rights. A county farmer has bought a 100
acre farm for under $1000 per acre, its agricultural use value alone,
because the owner kept the TDR's. Another farmer who had made
plans to move out of the county has decided to stay. It is too soon
to say that the system is an unqualified success, but the early signs
are encouraging. 65
In New Jersey, counties and municipalities with land in the Pineland
preserve still are working with the Pinelands Commission to develop local
master plans implementing the Comprehensive Plan.566 As of March,
1983, no development rights had been transferred on the open market,
but the Burlington County Board of Freeholders had made two purchases:
4.5 credits for $45,000 in October, 1982, and 2.5 credits for $25,000 in
early 1983.567
563. Conversation with Dale Price, supra note 562. Mr. Price believes the figure to be toward
the low end of the fair market value of the rights. Update: by the summer of 1983, over 400 rights
had been sold, preserving over 2000 acres of farmland. Tustian, supra note 562, at 64.
564. Id.
565. Tustian, supra note 562, at 64.
566. Parker, supra note 561 at 3-4; Conversation with Robert Bembridge, supra note 560.
567. First PDC's Sold in Pinelands, THE PINELANDER Newsletter of the New Jersey Pinelands
Comm., at 3, col. 2 (Nov./Dec. 1982). Burlington County Buys More PDC's, Id. at 3, col. 2 (Jan./
Feb. 1983). The $10,000 per credit price in the second transfer was held to be reasonable in Matlack
v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington County, L-69372-81 (Super. Ct. June __, 1983)
noted in Court Rulings Advanced Pinelands Protection, EDF Newsletter at 1, col. 3 (Aug. 1983).
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It is too early to predict with certainty whether they will be successful,
but it is clear that TDR programs possess great potential for protecting
agricultural land. To be sure, such programs provide no panacea. They
are economically feasible only in areas possessing both a market demand
for new housing within the receiving zones and use controls that limit
base density to a level that falls short of those demands. 68 In addition,
the allocation of development rights and the setting of base and bonus
densities require sophisticated economic analysis. 69 Nevertheless, by
compensating the farmer for restrictions on his ability to develop, properly
structured TDR programs combine land use controls and benefits which
offset the farmer's urge to succumb to development pressure. Since, as
discussed earlier, each element acts to constrain the private land devel-
opment cycle,570 TDR schemes, because they combine the two, should
prove to be one of the most effective vehicles for the preservation of
farmland.
In evaluating the other types of systems reviewed in this article, I have
first described a prototype plan and then compared it to a similar plan
which utilized a greater degree of planning. In each case, the latter
program, generally because it employed an element the prototype did
not, was shown to be, or to have the potential to be, more effective at
preserving farmland. Since a more carefully planned TDR program does
not exist, I have chosen to compare the TDR concept to agricultural
zoning which it both closely resembles and yet differs from sharply.
Consistent with the results of previous comparisons, I have concluded
that, even though zoning has experienced a degree of success, 7' TDR
programs possess greater potential for farmland preservation.
568. Costonis, supra note 512, at 101.
569. See generally, Berry & Steiker, An Economic Analysis of Transfer of Development Rights,
17 NAT. RES. J. 55 (1977).
Somewhat oversimplified, the analysis proceeds as follows: bonus densities must be set high
enough to make development in receiving zones economically attractive. Authorities must first locate
those zones in areas which have a market demand for more housing than land use restrictions then
permit and then, taking into account such factors as the ability of public facilities to accomodate
that growth, see infra text accompanying notes 576-77, determine how many additional housing
units can be absorbed. Development credits sufficient to meet that capacity must then be created.
Assuming for purposes of illustration the 1:1 development credit to bonus residence ratio envisioned
by the Montgomery County program, 15,000 development credits would be required to support
15,000 units in the receiving zone. Master Plan, supra note 515, at 46. Since the rights which those
credits represent must be severed from the sending zone, the number of acres in that zone must then
be divided by the number of credits needed. In Montgomery County, the 73,000 acre sending zone
yields approximately 15,000 credits, a ratio of one credit per five acres. Id. at 47. Finally, a base
density to which a farmer can develop his own land must be established in the sending zone. Again
in Montgomery County, it was determined that a ratio of one dwelling per 25 acres is consistent
with studies demonstrating that 25 acre farms, if properly managed, are economically viable. Id. at
44. In establishing the Pinelands Development Credit Program, the New Jersey Pinelands Commission
conducted a similar analysis. Comprehensive Plan, supra note 534, at 212.
570. See supra, text accompanying notes 259-60.
571. See supra, text accompanying notes 403-15.
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Setting aside for the moment discussion of the combined effect of those
elements, it appears that the use control elements in TDR programs,
standing alone, are more likely to effectively preserve agricultural land
than are those same elements in zoning schemes. As discussed previously,
large lot nonexclusive zoning ordinances, the most widely used type,
may in the long run defeat their intended purposes by fostering the "chop-
ping up of good agricultural land into minimum sized lots . . . thereby
accelerating the disintegration of the agricultural sector."57 By contrast,
in an economically viable TDR program, growth will take place primarily
in receiving zones.
A developer has a choice of which land to develop. If he does not
already own it, he can buy land in a receiving zone, the purchase price
of which may have increased as a function of its inclusion in that zone.
To be able to develop the land to the bonus density, he must also purchase
development rights. On the other hand, a developer could decide to
purchase farm zone land which, even though it can only be developed
to a restrictive base density, will, because it is further from existing
developed areas, probably carry a smaller purchase price. In a properly
structured TDR system, the developer will choose the receiving zone
option because the bonus density to which he can develop will permit
him to make the greatest profit.573 Indeed, one Montgomery County de-
veloper has stated that the availability of bonus credits enabled him to
reduce the price of houses by $10,000 per unit.574
The intensified construction which will thus occur in the receiving zone
fulfills both urban and rural planning goals which, as discussed previ-
ously,575 merge at the urban fringe. Urban goals are met in that devel-
opment is shifted to areas in which governmental services can be provided
efficiently. As noted previously, the Montgomery County master plan
provides that the designation of receiving zones be "consistent with en-
vironmental, transportation, housing and population guidelines" of the
various community master plans. 76 The plan provides further that "op-
tional densities shall not exceed the ability of the planned public facilities
to serve the area or the ability of the land to accommodate the optional
density. ""'
Correspondingly, the growth which the TDRs generate in receiving
zones helps to preserve farmland by ensuring that any development which
does occur in rural areas will almost surely be done by individuals. While
572. Supra note 416.
573. See supra note 569.
574. See supra, text accompanying note 565.
575. See supra, text accompanying note 74.
576. Master Plan, supra note 515, at 44.
577. Id. at 41.
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individual construction can also lead to a "chopping up" of the land,
there is less likelihood of that occurring with a TDR program than with
a zoning program. TDR systems complement their land use controls with
a benefit-payment for development rights-which serves as an incentive
for the farmer to resist development pressure. Under a zoning scheme,
the farmer must absorb the value lost as a result of regulation, and, if he
wishes to recoup his investment, he has no choice but to sell off his land,
possibly to individuals desiring a large lot in the country. By contrast,
under a TDR system, owners are compensated for the restrictions placed
on their land. Put another way, instead of being forced to sell their land
for development, farmers can recoup a large portion of their investment
by simply selling off development rights for use in receiving zones. Since
the farmer now has an incentive to resist development, a drop in individual
home construction should follow.
The coupling of benefits with use controls provides advantages other
than the creation of an environment which is less than hospitable to
farmland development. First of all, just as broad-based planning protects
agricultural zoning from constitutional attack, 78 the combination of use
control and compensation, itself a form of broad-based planning, also
ensures the legality of TDR programs.
In Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City,579 the owner of Grand
Central Station challenged the New York City Landmarks Commission's
rejection of its plans to build an office building atop the Grand Central
Station, contending that the landmark act on its face constituted a taking
of its air rights. Treating the act essentially as a zoning ordinance, the
Supreme Court rejected the argument.
[T]he submission that appellants may establish a "taking" simply by
showing that they have been denied the ability to exploit a property
interest that they heretofore had believed was available for devel-
opment is quite simply untenable. Were this the rule, this Court
would have erred not only in upholding laws restricting the devel-
opment of air rights, . . . but also in approving those prohibiting
both the subjacent ... and the lateral ... development of particular
parcels. [citations omitted]. "Taking" jurisprudence does not divide
a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether
rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In de-
ciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking,
this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on
the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as
a whole-here, the city tax block designated as the 'landmark site.'580
578. See supra, text accompanying notes 429-33.
579. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
580. Id. at 130-31.
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From the Court's response, it seems clear that a landowner in a TDR
farm zone will be unable to argue successfully that his "development
rights" have been taken.
In addition, everyone concerned in Penn Central-the parties, the Court,
and the dissenters-agreed that no taking would occur if, instead of
applying only to selected properties, the restrictions had been imposed
as part of an historic district preservation scheme. Justice Rehnquist, in
dissent, pointed out that under a zoning scheme,
[a]ll property owners in a designated area are placed under the same
restrictions, not only for the benefit of the municipality as a whole
but also for the common benefit of one another. In the words of Mr.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon ... there is "an average reciprocity of advantage."'
Likewise, "[In historic districting,] owners although burdened by the
restrictions also benefit, to some extent, from the furtherance of a general
community plan.""8 2
By analogy, agricultural TDR programs, which preserve farmland for
the benefit of the public at large, also enhance the economic viability of
the farm community. Farmers who want to remain in the business can
use the monies received from the sale of development rights to expand
their operations. Money spent for new equipment will help to ensure the
continued presence of farm service businesses." 3 More importantly, be-
cause its development value will have been severed, land can be purchased
at use value. Thus, those farmers who choose to reinvest will be able to
afford to purchase the land of those who want to recover their investment
and retire." 4 It follows that the "reciprocity of advantage" inherent in
the Montgomery County and Pinelands plans should bring them into
conformity with even the dissent's definition of constitutionality.585
Challenges to agricultural TDR systems, as applied to individual par-
cels, should also be unsuccessful. In concluding that the action of the
Landmarks Commission, as applied specifically to Penn Central, did not
constitute a taking, the Court noted that the restrictions in no way inter-
fered with the current use of the terminal.586 Similarly, restricting agri-
cultural areas primarily to farming does not interfere with their present
use.
581. Id. at 140.
582. Id. at 139, n. 2.
583. For a statement of the problem see generally, supra text accompanying notes 119-22.
584. One Montgomery county farmer was able to purchase 100 acres for under $1000 per acre,
its use value, because the seller kept the development credits. See text accompanying note 565,
supra.
585. Accord, Keene, supra note 8, at 635-645.
586. 438 U.S. 104, at 136.
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The Court also recognized the value of development credits which were
tranferable to any of Penn Central's surrounding properties. "While these
rights may well not have constituted 'just compensation' if a taking had
occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate whatever financial
burdens the law has imposed on the appellants and for that reason, are
to be taken into account in considering the impact of regulation."587
In its earlier review of the case, the New York Court of Appeals was
even more explicit:
Development rights, once transferred, may not be equivalent in value
to development rights on the original site. But that, alone, does not
mean that the substitution of rights amounts to a deprivation of
property without due process of law. Land use regulation often di-
minishes the value of the property to the landowner. Constitutional
standards, however, are offended only when that diminution leaves
the owner with no reasonable use of the property. The situation with
transferable development rights is analogous. If the substitute rights
received provide reasonable compensation for a landowner forced to
relinquish development rights on a landmark site, there has been no
deprivation of due process. The compensation need not be the "just"
compensation required in eminent domain, for there has been no
attempt to take property....
[TDRs] are valuable, and provide significant, perhaps "fair," com-
pensation'58 3 for the loss of rights above the terminal itself. Hence
no constitutional violation has been established.589
The same result should follow from a challenge to an agricultural TDR
system, provided the transfer credits are adequately marketable. Because
Penn Central's credits were transferable to several of its own parcels, the
issue was not really considered by the Penn Central Court. However, in
French Inv. Co. v. City of New York,5" the New York Court of Appeals
invalidated a zoning resolution restricting the use of private parkland,
although the owner received transfer credits.
By compelling the owner to enter an unpredictable real estate market
to find a suitable receiving lot for the rights, or a purchaser who
would then share the same interest in using additional development
rights, the amendment renders uncertain and thus severely impairs
587. Id. at 137.
588. See Costonis, Compensation And The Accommodation Power: Antidotes For The Taking
Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975). Similarly, in upholding
Montgomery County's downzoning of land in the agriculture reserve zone, the court in Dufour v.
Montgomery County Council (Jan. 20, 1983) (discussed in Tustian, supra note 562, at 71) held that
the rights had "a reasonably significant value." Bozung, supra note 561, at 132.
589. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y. 2d at 335-36, 366 N.E. 2d at 1278,
397 N.Y.S. 2d at 921-22 (1977).
590. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 340 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
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the value of the development rights before they were severed ...
Hence when viewed in relation to both the value of the private parks
after the amendment, and the value of the development rights de-
tached from the private parks, the amendment destroyed the eco-
nomic value of the property. It thus constituted a deprivation of
property without due process of law.59" '
By contrast, the drafters of the Montgomery County and Pinelands plans
have attempted to ensure marketability by taking the supply of potential
development sites into account in establishing sending and bonus ratios 92
and by creating development rights banks which are permitted to purchase
credits. 93 The programs should be able to withstand constitutional at-
tack.
594
In addition to ensuring their legality, the combination of use controls
and benefits helps to equitably distribute the benefits and burdens of such
a system. Under a zoning scheme, the farmer must absorb any value lost
as a result of regulation, while the landowner in a development zone
receives a windfall. 95 By contrast, under a TDR system
... [o]wners of restricted resources are not wiped out, but are duly
compensated, and the windfall of increased land values that owners
within transfer districts [or those to whom they sell] might otherwise
enjoy in consequence of these restrictions is offset by the payments
they must make for additional development rights. 96
It follows that TDR programs should be favorably received by the
agricultural community. As developed previously, land is a major in-
vestment for the fanner, often representing, among other things, his
retirement fund; programs, such as agricultural zoning, which limit his
ability to recover that investment inevitably give him cause for concern.5 97
TDR programs address those concerns since by selling his development
rights the fanner is able to recoup that portion of his investment which
591. 39 N.Y.2d at 598.
592. See supra, note 569.
593. See supra, text accompanying notes 559-61, 590-93.
594. The Montgomery County plan was upheld in Dufour v. Montgomery County Council, supra
note 588. The challengers alleged that zoning the agricultural reserve zone for agricultural use only
was a "taking" because no receiving zones had been designated at the time of the downzoning, thus
leaving them without a market for their right. The court held that the downzoning was permissible
on its own merit and thus did not turn on the TDR scheme; therefore, the absence of receiving zones
was immaterial. Tustian, supra note 562, at 71. The court went on to say that had the TDR scheme
been considered, the fact that the rights had "a reasonably significant value," Bozung, supra note
588, would have been further evidence that no taking had occurred. Tustian, supra note 562.
595. See generally, HAGMAN & MISCZYNSKI, WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS: LAND VALUE
CAPTURE AND COMPENSATION (1978) (prepared for HUD).
596. Costonis, supra note 512, at 99-100.
597. See supra, text accompanying 75-89.
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zoning would have "wiped out."' 59 8 It therefore seems probable that the
TDR concept will be met with more than the "grudging acceptance"
afforded agricultural zoning. 99
Thus, TDR programs, like the Wisconsin Farmland Preservation Act
and Minnesota's Metropolitan Preserves Act, respond to the special prob-
lems of the farmer. Although they employ different devices, each of the
three programs integrate land use controls with offsetting benefits ad-
dressed to the "values, goals, and assumptions"'  of the farming com-
munity. In other words, the programs "exercise rational control"'" over
land development through a theory of broad-based planning for the pres-
ervation of agricultural land. Of the programs reviewed in this article,
they are the most likely to succeed.
CONCLUSION
Since Maryland adopted the first differential assessment act in 1956,
state and local governments have been actively devising programs for the
protection of agricultural land. Those programs have been successful to
the extent they have been able to "exercise rational control" over the
private land development cycle by either imposing land use controls or
affording the farmer benefits which encourage him to resist development
pressure. At the urban fringe, where land is most vulnerable, benefits
alone have not been able to offset the possible financial gains to be had
from conversion to nonagricultural uses. On the other hand, land use
controls which restrict the farmer's ability to recover his investment but
do not provide compensatory benefits tend to be unpopular. Thus, the
programs which are, or have the potential to be, the most effective are
those which incorporate both elements into a theory of broad-based plan-
ning. In those programs, the public's interest in the preservation of ag-
ricultural land and the farmer's "values, goals, and assumptions" are
"mutually supportive."
598. Neither the Montgomery County nor the Pinelands plan addresses the taxability of credits
prior to transfer. The Buckingham Township plan provides for the taxation only upon issuance,
which does not occur until immediately prior to a previously negotiated sale. Bucks Twp. Zoning
Ord. reprinted in part in Schnidman, Transferable Development Rights: An Idea In Search of Im-
plementation, I 1 LAND & WATER L. REV. 339, 368-72 (1976). A proposed open space TDR
plan provides for taxation in the same manner as real property, using current sales to determine
value. Rose, supra note 511, at 661-62.
A strong argument can be made that since a farmer cannot develop beyond the base density, he
should be taxed only at that level. On the other hand, so long as an adequate credits market exists
(and given the existence of a credits "bank," it will) taxing credits would not unfairly force partic-
ipation.
599. See supra, text accompanying note 414.
600. See supra, text accompanying notes 75-89.
601. Id.
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